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ASCULUM DEFEATS:  
PROSECUTORIAL LOSSES IN THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 




 Small but consistent failures have marked the U.S. endeavor to 
use military commissions in the struggle against Al Qaeda.  The 
handful of cases have mostly ended in reversals of convictions and 
sentences.  This article will consider the possibility that conflating 
two kinds of crimes created the legal errors that led to these defeats.  
Law of war military commissions have historically been used not 
only as extraordinary venues for prominent war criminals, but also 
for preserving the vital role of combatant immunity.  Commissions 
thus tried those accused of grave breaches of international law as 
well as the kind of ordinary belligerency offenses that would not even 
have been illegal had the perpetrators been legitimate combatants.  
Because the military commissions stemming from the War on Terror 
drew precedent from all manner of past military commissions, whose 
rules contemplated trials for both kinds of accused, the government 
wandered into an ever-more labyrinthine view of the law 
appropriate to the commissions.  The article will consider the 
completed cases, focusing on the prosecution’s choice to emphasize 
inchoate offenses.  It will then compare international and domestic 
law and suggest that the government’s losses occurred because of the 
inappropriate amalgamation of grave breaches and belligerency 
offenses, and that the assessment of liability is very different between 
the two.  
International law has long recognized some species of expansive 
liability for grave breaches, but not for belligerency offenses.  Because 
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most detainee trials to date have been for belligerency offenses, the 
reliance on offenses like conspiracy and material support for 
terrorism has led to a string of reversals.  This article will suggest, 
however, that these defeats suffered by the United States have 
actually been to its benefit.  In the short term, the loss of confidence 
in the military commissions might make possible a federal trial for 
some of the remaining detainees, such as Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed.  The world benefits from a public trial of persons 
accused of grave breaches, but a U.S. military commission can no 
longer realize most of that potential benefit.  In the long term, a 
regime of international law that provided expanded liability for 
belligerency offenses would greatly harm U.S. strategic interests.  By 
losing a series of small judicial battles, the United States is positioned 
to win a much more significant war. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Pyrrhus replied to one that gave him joy of his victory that 
one other such would utterly undo him.”1 
The victory of King Pyrrhus of Epirus over the Romans2 is 
such a well-known feature of modern Western culture that it has 
become its own trope for movies,3 television,4 and books.5  After the 
battle at Asculum, Plutarch reports the quote above as Pyrrhus’s 
morose response to the good news.  Pyrrhus clearly recognized that 
his victory was so costly that the tactical advantage he gained was not 
truly worth the strategic loss he had suffered.6  Such a “Pyrrhic 
victory” offers an oddly counterintuitive lesson: winning is, in such a 
case, only the precursor to ultimate loss.  King Pyrrhus, and his 
struggle for Hellenic dominance in the Mediterranean, would have 
been much better off had he never fought the battle.  His brief 
successes led to the failures that enabled Rome to conquer all of 
Italy.7  
Seldom do we notice the other side of the equation.  The 
Romans, this suggests, were better off for having fought and lost this 
battle.  Had Pyrrhus husbanded his forces, he might have frustrated 
Roman plans much longer.8  In the long term, the Romans benefitted 
																																																								
1 PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 483 (JOHN DRYDEN 
TRANS., MODERN LIBRARY 1932). 
2 Id. 
3 See, e.g., Randall King, Cruise Control: Star’s Presence Overpowers What Could Be a 
Smart Science-fiction Story, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS (Apr. 19, 2013) (characterizing 
Earth’s victory over an alien enemy in “Oblivion” as Pyrrhic); Shea Conner, Movie 
Review: ‘Lincoln’, ST. JOSEPH NEWS-PRESS (Nov. 8, 2012) (noting that winning the 
civil war before passage of the Thirteenth Amendment could have proved a Pyrrhic 
victory for the cause of emancipation). 
4 See, e.g., Sarah Rodman, Buckle Up for Wild Ride to the Bottom, BOSTON GLOBE 
(July 13, 2012) (describing the opening of the final season of Breaking Bad as such a 
victory); Paul Brownfield, Jump Back In, LA TIMES  (Apr. 3, 2007) (describing the 
victories of Tony in The Sopranos as Pyrrhic).  
5 See, e.g., WALLACE THURMAN, THE BLACKER THE BERRY (1929). 
6 PLUTARCH, supra note 1, at 483. 
7 Id. at 486. 
8 Plutarch gives some credit both to Roman sacrificial auguries and the retreat of the 
elephants of Pyrrhus at the subsequent battle of Beneventum.  Id. 
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from a loss that they certainly did not greet with joy: like Voltaire’s 
Zadig,9 they had no idea at the time how beneficial the loss would 
become. 
Similarly, the United States appears to have suffered a 
number of legal defeats in the effort to conduct trials by military 
commission.  Like the Romans at Asculum, though, those very 
defeats may actually have benefitted the very government that lost 
them. 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
Government has faced a series of difficult legal choices about how to 
detain, and possibly punish, members of the forces opposing it.  One 
early decision resurrected the system of military commissions not 
seen in American law since the aftermath of the Second World 
War.10  An accompanying decision transformed the U.S. Naval Base 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into a detention center for foreign 
citizens who came into the custody of U.S. forces.11  A third decision 
linked these two choices, establishing Guantanamo as the venue for 
any trials by military commission that the War on Terror brought 
forth.12  Each of these choices has generated huge scholarly output,13 
																																																								
9 The titular protagonist of Voltaire's story is a Babylonian philosopher who is 
instructed by an angel disguised as a hermit.  The angel teaches Zadig that deeds that 
appear to be bad may turn out later to be good, and vice versa.  VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 
& SELECTED STORIES 169 (Donald M. Frame, trans., The New American  
Library 1961) (“‘Men,’ said the angel Jesrad, ‘pass judgment on everything without 
knowing anything.’”). 
10 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831 (Nov. 16, 2001).	
11 Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 551, 557 (2013). 
12 Janet Cooper Alexander, Military Commissions: A Place Outside the Law’s  
Reach, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1115, 1118 (2012). 
13 See, e.g., Gerald Neuman, Extraterritoriality and the Interest of the United States in 
Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1441, 1459 (2014); David Glazier, Destined 
for an Epic Fail: The Problematic Guantanamo Military Commissions, 75 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 903, 915 (2014). See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism  
Suspects, 61 DUKE L. J. 1415 (2012); Gabor Rona, Legal Issues in the “War on 
Terrorism” - Reflecting on the Conversation between Silja N.U. Voneky and John 
Bellinger, 9 GERMAN L.J. 711 (2008); David Frakt, The Practice of Criminal Law in the 
Guantánamo Military Commissions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 35 (2011); Peter Margulies, 
Defining, Punishing, and Membership in the Community of Nations: Material 
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along with many judicial challenges in various fora.14  Neither the 
Bush nor Obama Administrations have had consistent winning 
streaks while defending these decisions.  Both suffered rebukes from 
courts that required them to redesign their legal plans repeatedly by 
enlisting the help of Congress.15  Even after congressional assistance, 
more defeats ensued. 
This article reviews some of those defeats, as well as some of 
the relatively easy victories that accompanied them.  Part I considers 
the possibility that conflating two kinds of crimes in commissions 
contributed to a recurrence of legal errors that called forth judicial 
upbraiding.  Military commissions have multiple roles, and the 
United States has historically used them not only as extraordinary 
venues for prominent leaders accused of war crimes, but also for 
much more ordinary soldiers and other belligerents.16  Small but 
consistent failures have resulted from the government’s attempts to 
resolve cases involving both kinds of accused persons under 
commissions, resulting in an ever-more labyrinthine view of the 
appropriate law to apply to modern commissions.  Part II examines 
the handful of cases completed since the beginning of the War on 
Terror, looking to the differences between those that ended with 
successful convictions, and those that the defendant successfully 
appealed.  Part III, which looks to the reason for the failures, 
concludes that the die was cast by the government’s insistent reliance 
on charges of inchoate conspiracy and material support for 
terrorism.  Part III will then compare international and domestic law 
and suggest that the government’s losses occurred because of the 
conflation of grave breaches and belligerency offenses, and that the 
																																																																																																																					
Support and Conspiracy Charges in Military Commissions, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 
(2013); Geoffrey S. Corn & Chris Jenks, A Military Justice Solution in Search of a 
Problem: A Response to Vladeck,104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 29 (2015). 
14 See infra at Part II. 
15 See, e.g., the Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119  
Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005) [hereinafter D.T.A.], and the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) [hereinafter M.C.A.].	
16 Compare Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946) (wherein the charge 
alleged the execution of a plan by which “more than 25,000 men, women and 
children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, were brutally mistreated and killed”), 
with Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1942) (the accused possessed explosives with 
the intent to “to destroy war industries and war facilities in the United States”). 
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treatment of liability for inchoate offenses is very different between 
the two.  Lastly, Part IV will suggest that these setbacks suffered by 
the United States have actually been to its benefit.  In the short term, 
the loss of confidence in the military commissions might make 
possible a federal trial for some of the remaining detainees, such as 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.  The nation and the world benefit from a 
public trial of persons accused of grave breaches, but most of that 
potential gain can no longer be realized by a U.S. military 
commission.  In the long term, a regime of international law that 
provided expanded liability for belligerency offenses would greatly 
harm U.S. strategic interests.  Had the United States gotten what it 
wanted, it would have regretted it in both the near and long term 
future.  Instead, the United States, like Rome before it, has benefitted 
from a series of Asculum defeats. 
I. BY ANY OTHER NAME: CONFLATING THE CRIMES TRIED BY 
 COMMISSIONS 
A. Overview of Commissions  
The Supreme Court has recognized three distinct types of 
military commissions.17   Two of them, martial law and military 
government commissions, function in place of ordinary criminal law 
courts when those are not available. 18   The third, law of war 
commissions, are defined not by their location but by their 
jurisdiction.19  Martial law commissions occur domestically when a 
breakdown in order or threat of invasion has led to a declaration of 
martial law.20  Military government commissions happen on foreign 
soil, when occupation by the United States requires the use of 
commissions to keep law and order in the absence of a local 
government.21  Martial law was never at issue in the U.S. war against 
																																																								
17 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595-97 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 The Supreme Court has established limits on such commissions.  Id. at 595; see 
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (holding that a statute authorizing 
martial law does not "authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals"). 
21 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 595-96. 
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Al Qaeda.22  The attacks of September 11, 2001, though horrific, were 
not accompanied by a legitimate fear of invasion by enemy forces.23  
Likewise, the United States does not appear to have seriously 
considered using military commissions as an arm of military 
governance.  This reluctance may stem from the United States 
obligation to maintain local courts, even as an occupying force.24  
Using military commissions to enforce ordinary criminal laws 
against larceny of private property, or even murder,25 was once a 
commonplace of international conduct.26  Although the precedents 
have not been formally displaced, the development of a large body of 
law governing occupations has largely discouraged such methods.27  
Further, a global rejection of the very concept of occupation has 
fostered a desire among many countries to create local autonomy 
																																																								
22 Glazier, supra note 13, at 912. 
23 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 324 (court's holding in Duncan only allows military 
commissions where civilian courts do not function, they were never an option after 
Al Qaeda's attack). 
24 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, 132 
(2009).	
25 See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (holding that a U.S. military 
commissions in post-World War II Germany had jurisdiction to try for murder the 
civilian wife of an American military officer because the commission was "designed 
especially to meet the needs of law enforcement in that occupied territory in relation 
to civilians and to nonmilitary offenses"). 
26 See Michael O. Lacey, Military Commissions: A Historical Survey, 2002 ARMY  
LAW 41, 41-42 (2002) (the earliest uses of military tribunals tended to be for what we 
would now characterize as law of war offenses, such as those convened by King 
Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years War and nations have used them for 
hundreds of years for general matters of governance).  See Anil Kalhan, et al., 
Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security Laws in India, 20 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 126 (2006) (noting that an act of 1861 granted the Governor-
General authorization to convene "special tribunals" to preserve law and order); 
PETER JUDSON RICHARDS, EXTRAORDINARY JUSTICE: MILITARY TRIBUNALS IN 
HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 18-19 (2007) (noting that Winfield 
Scott's General Order creating such military commissions primarily "identified 
criminal offenses normally cognizable by civil courts in time of peace"); id. at 73-74 
(noting that French principles of republicanism limited the use of such tribunals, les 
conseils de guerre, to "the state of siege"). 
27 See, e.g., Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, Geneva, Switz., Aug. 12, 1949 (Feb. 2, 1956) 6 U.S.T. 3516. 
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over such matters,28 even before a formal transfer of authority to the 
host nation which may be more formal than real. 
Thus, although the current commissions have been of the 
law of war variety,29 the existence of precedents of all three kinds has 
led to confusion about their jurisdiction.30  That confusion was 
evident in the recent argument among federal judges about the 
nature of the commissions that tried those accused of conspiring in 
the plot to kill President Lincoln and other senior government 
officials in April 1865.31  Whether conspiracy was actually triable by 
military commissions divided a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”).32  Part of the reason for the split 
was a disagreement over whether the Lincoln commissions furnished 
valid precedent as a law of war commission, or whether their value 
must be discounted because they were mixed commissions, 
functioning in both the law of war and martial law realms.33 
B. Distinguishing Conduct in War 
Confusion has resulted in the area of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  The terms “war crime” or “violation of the law of armed 
conflict” have been used interchangeably to describe two very 
																																																								
28 "After WWII - possibly due to the odium attached to belligerent occupation by the 
appalling Nazi and Japanese record - there has been a considerable reluctance by 
States to admit that they were Occupying Powers." DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 10.  
There are also sound practical reasons that promote a devolution of power, "the 
military government of an occupied territory would be eager to avail itself of the 
continued service of some low-level officials....The reason is prosaic: it is a matter of 
expediency and conservation of resources."  Id. at 57.	
29 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) ("Since Guantanamo Bay is 
neither enemy-occupied territory nor under martial law, the law-of-war commission 
is the only model available."). 
30 See, e.g., Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
31 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 145 
(Nancy Spears & Patricia Hass eds., 1st ed. 1998). 
32 See generally Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
33 Compare Al Bahlul, 792 F.3d at 12 ("Winthrop noted that the Lincoln assassins' 
tribunal was a mixed martial law and law of war military commission"), with id. at 60 
(Henderson, J., dissenting) ("because the military cannot exercise martial law 
jurisdiction unless civilian courts are closed (citation omitted), the Lincoln 
conspirators’ military court necessarily was purely a military commission with law-
of-war (including conspiracy) jurisdiction"). 
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different types of offenses against international order: grave breaches 
and belligerency offenses.34  International and domestic law of war 
commissions have tried both of these two species of crime. 35   
Therefore, the precedents have a surface similarity.  Unfortunately, 
because of their fundamentally different natures, these two varieties 
of crime have completely separate rules regarding liability for 
inchoate offenses such as conspiracy.36  Because courts have often 
merged these two strands similarly, they have at times erred by 
applying the conclusions from one area of law to the other.37  What 
this article will call “belligerency offenses” are those acts that 
represent the ordinary duties of military forces, when committed by 
those who are not part of a legitimate military force.  Soldiers and 
sailors function by destroying the fighting capacity of their enemy: in 
short, by harming people and things.  The primary mission of an 
armed force, the reduction of opposing military forces, by definition 
requires the killing and wounding of humans and the destruction of 
																																																								
34 Compare Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 14 n.12 (1942) (“Authorities on 
International Law have regarded as war criminals such persons who pass through 
the lines for the purpose of (a) destroying bridges, war materials, communication 
facilities etc.”), with DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 95 (“It is for the Occupying Power to 
determine—through legislation—what specific acts…constitute punishable acts of 
sabotage when committed in occupied territory.  International law, as such, does not 
penalize these acts”). 
35 Some scholars use the phrase “direct participation in hostilities” for the same 
species of offense.  See, e.g., David Frakt, Direct Participation in Hostilities as a War 
Crime: America’s Failed Efforts to Change the Law of War, 46 VAL. U.L. REV. 729, 752 
(2012).  Because it is difficult to characterize many of the acts the United States has 
attempted to punish at the military commissions as “direct participation,” I have 
opted for the more general “belligerency offenses.” 
36 See, e.g., Allison Marson Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 118 (2005) (noting the differences between joint 
criminal enterprise under international law and the common law doctrine of 
conspiracy). 
37 This was the source of the dispute between the majority and dissent in the al 
Bahlul case: if the tribunal that tried the Lincoln conspirators were of the same type 
as the commission faced by al Bahlul, it stood as precedent for the use of conspiracy.  
If it was a different type, it could not do so.  See Al Bahlul, 792 F.3d at 12. 
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property.38  Such acts, outside of the context of war, are generally the 
subject of criminal sanction.39  
This concept of “combatant immunity” arose from an 
ancient recognition that punishing an enemy soldier for those 
ordinary military acts would significantly decrease the willingness of 
enemies to surrender or otherwise cease fighting.40  A desire to avoid 
a perpetual state of war required battlefield forces to accept that their 
surrender was not a death sentence.  Because of this very realistic 
assessment of human nature, the notion that enemy soldiers had not 
committed murder is one of the oldest principles of the law of war.41  
Only those countries and regimes that deliberately sought to escalate 
conflicts into existential struggles violated it.42 
Because this immunity meant that the military was treated 
differently in terms of criminal liability, it became important to 
determine who qualified for this different treatment.  An area of 
																																																								
38 This is so central a concept that the classical legal documents governing armed 
conflict treated it as the most basic underlying assumption.  See Hague Convention 
No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2259,  
Art. 22 (1907) (“The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited”). 
39 Glazier, supra note 13, at 915 (“All societies criminalize deliberate killing and 
destruction of property, the very acts that governments require their militaries to 
perform during war”). 
40 This idea is an old one indeed, and is suggested even by ancient China's great 
military philosopher.  See SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 76 (Samuel B. Griffith, trans., 
Oxford University Press, 1963) ("Treat the captives well, and care for them...This is 
called 'winning a battle and becoming stronger'"). 
41 Thus, punishing them as if they had committed murder is itself wrong.  In his 
otherwise hagiographic play about Henry V, Shakespeare allows a Welsh officer to 
criticize King Henry V for ordering the killing of prisoners of war.  WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE OF HENRY THE FIFTH act 4, sc. 7 ("Kill the poys and the 
luggage! 'tis expressly against the law of arms: 'tis as arrant a piece of knavery, mark 
you now, as can be offer’t, in your conscience, now, is it not?"). 
42 Richard J. Galvin, The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission Covering World War 
II Era Japanese War Crimes, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 59, 69 (2003) (describing the 
Imperial conviction that prisoners of war were essentially military supplies to be 
used as needed and observing that "Japanese administrative personnel in the Burma-
Thailand camps further conveyed their philosophy through arm bands, which 
stated: 'One captured in battle is to be beheaded and castrated at the will of the 
Emperor'").  
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great development over the last two centuries has concerned this very 
issue.43  Some people and nations sought to expand the definition of 
combatant immunity, and others sought to maintain a narrow 
definition.44  Belligerency offenses, then, are those acts that would not 
be criminal if committed by those who possessed this immunity.45  
Otherwise conforming to the law of war, such acts would be the 
ordinary duties of an ordinary soldier.  Only if a civilian committed 
them, someone who did not qualify as a soldier, would they become 
punishable.46 
This article will use the term “grave breaches,” on the other 
hand, for those offenses that violate such fundamental tenets of 
international law that it does not matter if the individuals who 
committed them were soldiers or civilians.47  The globalization and 
mechanization of warfare in the 20th century led to an increasing 
reliance on national behavior that shocked and frightened much of 
humanity.48  World War II in particular saw massive attacks on 
																																																								
43 Because there had been centuries of custom in the development of the law of war, 
the earliest work at setting the rules down in conventions acknowledged, in the 
famous Maartens clause, that such customs provided a basis for the protection of 
both soldiers and civilians.  Rona, supra note 13, at 714.  
44 A series of revolutions against colonial governance were largely responsible for the 
extraordinary transition of this area in three decades, from the carefully detailed list 
of qualifications for combatant status of 1949, to the much broader approach taken 
by the 1977 Protocol.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 44, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 (allowing combatants to maintain their status providing only that they 
carry arms openly while fighting, and while “visible to the adversary while he is 
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack . . . .”). 
45 See Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L. J. 367, 
436-38 (2004). 
46 See id. 
47 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW IN WAR, 309-10 (2010) (citing the post-World War II trial of the manufacturers 
of the poison gas used in Nazi death camps). 
48 See, e.g., ARCHER JONES, THE ART OF WAR IN THE WESTERN WORLD 579 (2001) 
(describing a primary facet of strategic bombing in World War II as "compelling the 
enemy to end the war through the terror of the raids"). 
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civilian populations, both within and outside the jurisdiction of 
occupying powers.49  
The sense of “never again”50 that led to the convening of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 51  inspired the 
gathering in Geneva to rewrite and reform humanitarian law.52  The 
four Conventions produced there, and now agreed to by every nation 
on the earth,53 set forth a series of “grave breaches,” offenses so 
terrible that subscribing parties to the conventions have an 
affirmative duty to prevent and punish them.54  The commission of 
these offenses may lead to criminal penalties regardless of the actor’s 
status.55   Legitimate military service is simply not relevant in a 
determination of guilt: being a soldier will not prevent a conviction, 
nor will being a civilian.56  Although the list of grave breaches in the 
Geneva Conventions seems quite limited, this article will use the 
																																																								
49 See THEODORE ROPP, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 380 (1959) (noting the 
hundreds of thousands killed by the atomic bombs dropped on Japan at the end of 
World War II, and quoting U.S. General H. H. Arnold as observing that 
"[d]estruction is too cheap, too easy"). 
50 The earliest use of this phrase as a reference to the horrors of World War II may 
have been in the documentary film "Mein Kampf," originally "Den Blodiga Tiden," 
by German filmmaker Erwin Leiser.  THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 451 (Fred. R. 
Shapiro, ed., 2006). 
51 Francis Biddle, The Nurnberg Trial, 33 VA. L. REV. 679 (1947). 
52 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter G.C. 
(I)]; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of Aug. 12, 1949, 6  
U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter G.C. (II)]; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War of Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter G.C. 
(III)]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter G.C. (IV)]. 
53 The newest independent nation, South Sudan, ratified all four of the 1949 
conventions on Jan. 25, 2013.  Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries: South 
Sudan, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (last visited May 22, 2016), 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countr
ySelected=SS&nv=4. 
54 See G.C. (I), supra note 52, at art. 50; G.C. (II), supra note 52, at art. 51; G.C. (III), 
supra note 52, at art. 130; G.C. (IV), supra note 52, at art. 147. 
55 G.C. (I), supra note 52, at art. 49. 
56 Thus, both civilians and military officers stood trial at the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg.  TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG  
TRIALS 89-90 (1992). 
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term for any offense for which the identity of the perpetrator is 
irrelevant, and hence for which combatant immunity is not a 
defense, as all of the non-belligerency offenses chargeable in military 
commissions can be analogized to one or more of Geneva's grave 
breaches.57 
Unfortunately, the nature of the two types of crimes, and the 
fact that they were often tried in the same military tribunals, have led 
to mistakes about the way liability is treated between them.  Because 
courts and commentators have not always recognized the difference 
between the two species of crimes at issue, there is sometimes 
confusion as to whether or not the law of armed conflict permits or 
forbids conviction for conspiring to commit a crime.58  
For a variety of reasons, not least among them ease of 
prosecution, the current commissions have focused on belligerency 
offenses. 59   Unfortunately, the United States has attempted to 
establish liability for inchoate offenses in trials by military 
commission.  Courts have generally rebuffed these efforts, which 
have resulted in Asculum defeats for two successive administrations.  
Had the prosecution won more of these battles, the future would be a 
much bleaker place for American interests as well as the international 
order. 
II. ALL OUR YESTERDAYS: A COLLECTION OF PROSECUTION 
 VICTORIES AND DEFEATS 
A. Seemingly Easy Wins 
During the initial phase of the military commissions, their 
irrelevance appeared to be their most consistent feature.60  After the 
																																																								
57 G.C. (IV), supra note 52, at art. 147. 
58 Compare Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("[t]he 
government concedes that conspiracy is not a violation of the international law of 
war.") with id. at 49 (Henderson, J. dissenting) ("the Congress has taken a preexisting 
international law-of-war offense—conspiracy to commit war crimes—and 
eliminated one element."). 
59 See infra Part II. 
60 Alexander, supra note 12, at 1119 (“Within two months of the executive order 
decreeing that suspected terrorists should be tried exclusively in military 
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initial presidential order of November 2001 announcing the use of 
military commissions,61 scholars and commentators watched eagerly 
to see what procedures would develop and who would be subject to 
them.62  The first set of potential procedures, issued in March 2002,63 
were met with a barrage of commentary, much of it critical.64  Over 
time, both internal and external challenges to the commissions 
caused the rules to be issued, amended, reissued, 65 and ultimately 
made the subject of formal legislation.66   By the time Congress 
stepped into the fray in December 2006, there had still not been a 
single trial on the merits during the more than five years of the 
military commission effort.  Likely feeling uneasy about having 
																																																																																																																					
commissions, three high-profile criminal prosecutions of alleged al Qaeda or Taliban 
members were brought in federal court.”). 
61 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
62 See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, Understanding September 11-An International Legal 
Perspective on the War in Afghanistan, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 283, 283-93 (2002); 
Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the 
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1259-1310 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, The 
Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L. J. 23, 23-40 (2002); Ronald C. Smith, The First 
Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Terrorists, 16 CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2002); Charles V. Pena, 
Blowback: The Unintended Consequences of Military Tribunals, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 119, 119-32 (2002).  
63 Dep’t of Def., Military Comm’n Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military 
Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War against  
Terrorism (21 Mar. 2002). 
64 See, e.g., Gerard J. Clark, Military Tribunals and the Separation of Powers, 63 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 837, 837 (2002); Robert John Araujo, S.J., A Judicial Response to 
Terrorism: the Status of Military Commissions under Domestic and International 
Law, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 118 (2003); Kathleen M. McCarroll, With 
Liberty and Justice for All: the November 13, 2001 Military Order Allowing the Use of 
Military Tribunals to Try Those Suspected of Aiding Terrorists Violates the Rights 
Guaranteed to Noncitizen United States Residents under the Constitution, 80 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 231, 232 (2003); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Congressional Authorization And The War On Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 
2049 (2005); Srividhya Ragavan and Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detainees 
from the Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 619, 619-76 (2005). 
65 David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the 
Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 150-51 (2008) 
(recounting the issuance of various rules and orders over a two-year period). 
66 After the Supreme Court rejected the executive branch procedures in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act.  See M.C.A., supra  
note 15; see also infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.  
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created a system that did not seem to have any ability to function, the 
government was in sore need of an easy win. 
1. The Easiest Case: The Story of David Hicks 
The first conviction exemplified such a win.  David Matthew 
Hicks,67 born in Australia, had converted to Islam in 1999, traveled to 
Albania,68 and later to Afghanistan, to study the Quran and train 
with Al Qaeda.69  After courses in surveillance and urban warfare, he 
briefly went to Pakistan to visit a friend, where he saw televised 
coverage of Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States.70  Shortly after the 
September 11 attacks he sought to return to Afghanistan to join Al 
Qaeda there.71  By mid-December he had been captured by the 
Northern Alliance while attempting to flee in a taxicab he had paid 
for by selling his weapon.72 
Over the course of the next several years, the battles over the 
fate of David Hicks shifted from some of the most brutal military 
conflicts of the early 21st century to legally and politically charged 
conflicts on two continents.73  In Australia, the government of Prime 
Minister John Howard had no interest in withdrawing Hicks from 
American custody, or preventing his trial by military commission.74  
																																																								
67 See United States v. Hicks, No. 0002 (Office of Military Comm’ns, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, March 26 & 30, 2007) [hereinafter Hicks ROT]. 
68 Id. at 200. 
69 Id. at 102. 
70 Id. at 108. 
71 Id. at 109. 
72 Id. at 116. 
73 Or three; because his mother was a citizen of the United Kingdom, attorneys for 
David Hicks fought to have him awarded British citizenship.  Although the courts 
ordered the government to grant him citizenship, British Home Secretary John Reid 
did so only to revoke it hours later, using his power to find that Hicks posed "a threat 
to the national security of the United Kingdom." Vikram Dodd, Reid Revoked 
Citizenship of Guantánamo Detainee, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2007). 
74 LEX LASRY, THE UNITED STATES V. DAVID MATTHEW HICKS: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT OBSERVER FOR THE LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, GUANTANAMO BAY, 
CUBA 15-16 (2007) (Austl.) (noting the government position that Hicks had 
committed no crime under Australian law, but desiring that he be tried nevertheless, 
and characterizing his return before a U.S. trial as causing his freedom on "a 
technicality or loophole"). 
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In the United States, a variety of parties attempted, in the name of all 
the detainees, to end the possibility of trials by such commissions.75 
By March 2007, at the very time that the defense was raising 
a series of pretrial motions in the military commission, David Hicks 
was apparently ready to give in.76  He offered a pretrial agreement 
with the government, which the convening authority of the military 
commissions accepted.77  Under the terms of the agreement, Hicks 
would plead guilty to a single specification of material support for 
terrorism78 and, among other conditions, refrain from discussing 
matters with the press for at least one year. 79   In return, the 
convening authority would dismiss the other charges and limit his 
sentence to no more than seven years,80 no more than nine months of 
which would be unsuspended.81  
The military panel that heard the sentencing evidence and 
arguments returned with a sentence of seven years, 82  and the 
convening authority approved it, suspending all but the initial nine 
months.83  Within six weeks, David Hicks flew back to Australia to 
serve his unsuspended sentence in a maximum-security facility.84  By 
																																																								
75 See Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1153 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that this group of citizens did not have standing to challenge the 
detention at Guantanamo Bay). 
76 LASRY, supra note 74, at 27 (including a motion to disqualify the military judge. 
After the guilty plea, the Australian observer characterized the motions hearing as "a 
contrived affair," and said it was designed "for public and media consumption"). 
77 Hicks ROT, supra note 67, at 124. In military commissions, as in courts-martial, a 
pre-trial agreement is between the accused and the convening authority. In return 
for pleading guilty to some or all of the charged offenses, the accused receives the 
benefit of having the convening authority approve no more of the adjudged sentence 
than that set forth in the sentence limitation portion of the agreement. See id. 
78 Id. at 126. 
79 Id. at 129. 
80 Id. at 145. 
81 Id. at 146. As seven years of confinement was the maximum punishment for the 
specification to which Hicks pled guilty, the suspension was the core of the 
agreement.  See id. at 147.  
82 Hicks ROT, supra note 67, at 245. 
83 Id. at 247 (suspension mandated by the convening authority during a post-trial 
action, May 1, 2007). 
84 Barbara McMahon, Guantánamo Detainee Flies Back to Jail in Australia, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 21, 2007). 
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the end of 2007, he had been released.85  His release ended the formal 
confinement of the first person convicted by a U.S. military 
commission since the post-World War II period.86 
2. The Slightly Less Easy Case of Omar Khadr 
Omar Khadr’s commission trial, like that of David Hicks, 
ultimately featured a guilty plea.87  Unlike the Hicks proceedings, 
Khadr’s involved a more sympathetic accused. 88   Hicks was 
characterized as a bad actor, a dispirited youth who had dropped out 
of his own society seeking to assist known terrorists in the 
accomplishment of their military objectives.89  Omar Khadr, on the 
other hand, was merely a child when he first became involved with 
the U.S. War on Terror.90  Although he was a Canadian citizen, born 
in Toronto, Khadr’s parents moved the family back and forth 
between Canada and their home country of Pakistan during the first 
few years of his life.91  By 1996, then nine-year-old Khadr and his 
family had moved to Afghanistan.92  They were there during the U.S. 
fight against the Taliban, and a conflict between a U.S. military 
reconnaissance party and Khadr’s father and uncle led to Khadr's 
wounding and capture in 2002.93 
																																																								
85 Barbara McMahon, Australia Frees its Guantanamo Terror Inmate, THE GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 28, 2007). 
86 William Colepaugh, an American citizen convicted by military tribunal at the end 
of the war, was paroled in 1960, PIERCE O’DONNELL, IN TIME OF WAR 285 (2005). 
87 United States v. Khadr, No. 0766, at 4673 (Office of Military Comm’ns, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Aug. 9-12, 2007, Oct. 25-31, 2010) [hereinafter Khadr 
ROT]. 
88 Frakt, supra note 35, at 752-53. 
89 Hicks ROT, supra note 67, at 204 (prosecution sentencing argument that Hicks 
"freely chose to walk away from those freedoms [election, religion, and association] 
to assist Al Qaeda). 
90 Khadr ROT, supra note 87, at 4838. 
91 United States v. Khadr, Stipulation of Fact, Prosecution Ex. 12, 13 (Oct. 2010) p. 3. 
92 Id. at 4 (noting that Khadr met "senior al Qaeda leaders" between the ages of 9  
and 14). 
93 See United States v. Khadr, No. 13-005, at 7-8 (USMCR Stipulation of Fact, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Oct. 13, 2010). One interrogator at Bagram Air Base, who 
described himself as being known as "Monster," reported that Khadr's chest wound 
was "so large that one could fit a can of Copenhagen inside his chest," and that the 
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American forces took 16-year-old Khadr to Guantanamo 
Bay, where in a trial by military commission the prosecution noted 
that he had used weapons to attack and kill American soldiers,94 even 
though he was not a member of a proper armed force.95  Because he 
was a minor, much criticism focused on the United States’ decision 
to treat him the same way that it treated adults.  Most of the scholarly 
discussion of the Khadr case concerned this aspect of the 
prosecution.  Many commentators found something unseemly, if not 
illegal, about the prosecution of a child soldier.96  Less common, but 
perhaps more significant, was the critique that Khadr had been in a 
group of family members returning an attack by combatant forces.97   
In October 2010, Khadr mimicked Hicks in pleading guilty 
in return for a limit on his sentence, which would be followed by a 
return to Canada.98  The commission sentenced him to confinement 
for 40 years, 99  but the agreement limited the amount that the 
convening authority could approve to 8 years.100  In September 2012, 
																																																																																																																					
interrogators called Khadr "Buckshot Bob" because his face "looked like he'd been 
blasted with a shotgun," Defendant’s Exhibit K at 1, United States v. Khadr,  
No. 13-005 (USCMCR 2008).  
94 Khadr ROT, supra note 87, at 4830 (prosecution opened its closing argument by 
calling Khadr "a terrorist and a murderer"). 
95 Frakt, supra note 35, at 752 (calling Khadr “the clearest example of a detainee 
being prosecuted and convicted for direct participation in hostilities.”). 
96 See, e.g., Christopher L. Dore, What to do with Omar Khadr? Putting a Child 
Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and Moral 
Culpability, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1281, 1320 (2008) ("Omar cannot shoulder the 
blame of his actions alone. At fifteen, he was a product of his environment, and 
lacked the resources, the moral motivation, and the developmental capabilities to 
escape the circumstances that placed him on a battlefield in the Afghan 
countryside."). 
97 Glazier, supra note 65, at 186 ("Khadr would have the legal status of a deer during 
hunting season – fair game for coalition forces to kill at will yet possessing no right 
to fight back."). 
98 Frakt, supra note 13, at 51 (crediting the work by Khadr's lawyers litigating and 
lobbying in Canada for the ultimate acceptance by the U.S. of the plea deal). 
99 Khadr ROT, supra note 87, at 4890. 
100 See United States v. Khadr, No. 13-005, at 6 (USMCR Offer for Pre-trial 
Agreement, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Oct. 13, 2010). 
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he returned to Canada.101  A Canadian court ordered his release on 
bail in May 2015.102 
In the cases of both David Hicks and Omar Khadr, the guilty 
pleas by defendants seeking to end what must have seemed like 
possibly perpetual pre-trial confinement avoided troubling legal 
issues.  Military practice, like its civilian counterpart, includes a 
robust doctrine of waiver.  A guilty plea makes most legal errors 
unreviewable by appellate courts. 103  Unfortunately for the stability of 
the military commissions’ prosecution effort, some accused were to 
be convicted only after a full trial.  That would allow them to 
continue to litigate the legal bases of their guilt, bases on which the 
guilt of David Hicks and Omar Khadr was also founded.  Courts 
would eventually turn even these simple tactical victories into 
strategic defeats.104  Unbeknownst to those prosecutors, however, 
these were Asculum defeats, temporary setbacks preventing far worse 
future outcomes.  
B. Seemingly Tougher Losses 
In light of their respective appellate proceedings, neither 
Hicks nor Khadr truly presented easy cases.  At the time, however, 
																																																								
101 Omar Khadr Returns to Canada, CBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2012, 6:43 AM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/omar-khadr-returns-to-canada-1.937754. 
102 The Canadian government appealed the decision, and lost in July, 2015.  Khadr's 
Release on Bail 'Disappointing,' Says Public Safety Minister, CBC NEWS  
(May 7, 2015, 9:59 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/omar-khadr-s-
release-on-bail-disappointing-says-public-safety-minister-1.3064945.  
103 DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  
§ 14-3(B)(3) at 779 (8th ed. 2012) (“A plea of guilty will, as a general rule, waive all 
objections or issues that are not jurisdictional or deprive an accused of due 
process.”). 
104 In 2015, the Court of Military Commission Review set aside the findings of guilt 
and sentence of David Hicks.  Hicks v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1247-48 
(C.M.C.R. 2015).  The pretrial agreement had required Hicks to waive not only 
pretrial motions but also post-trial appellate review.  Unfortunately for the United 
States, the Rule for Military Commissions provision at issue, 950c, required any such 
waiver to occur not less than ten days after the Convening Authority took action.  
Because Hicks’s only waiver came during the trial, and thus before action, the Court 
set aside his waiver.  Id. at 1243. Having done so, they quickly disposed of the case 
because of the intervening holding of the al Bahlul court that material support to 
terrorism in these commissions violated the ex post facto clause.  Id. at 1247-48.  
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they seemed to be almost absurdly uncomplicated, as each involved a 
voluntary guilty plea by a citizen of an allied nation eager to return to 
his homeland.  The other cases, some of which also involved guilty 
pleas, were significantly more complicated.  Because the detainees in 
the next two prominent cases were convicted notwithstanding their 
pleas, they were able to litigate their legal objections to the military 
commissions.  That litigation subsequently led to Asculum defeats 
for the prosecution. 
1. Hamdan, the Supreme Court, and a Second Chance 
The first of these, and the military commission case that has 
reached the highest level of judicial resolution, involved the former 
driver and bodyguard of Osama Bin Laden, Salim Hamdan.105  After 
Hicks, Hamdan was the second accused to face trial by commission.  
Unlike Hicks, he pled not guilty, but was ultimately convicted of five 
specifications of material support for terrorism. 106  Before the 
conviction, however, he managed to change the face of American 
law.107  While the initial set of charges, which were preferred under 
the rules established by the Department of Defense in 2002,108 were 
pending, he sought the intervention of federal courts.109  He argued 
that the military commissions had no jurisdiction over conspiracy 
under either U.S. statutory or international law, and that the 
procedures for the current commission violated both international 
and domestic law.  Hamdan took his case as far as the U.S. Supreme 
Court,110 where a majority agreed that congressional limitations and 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prevented his trial in the tribunal as 
it was then constituted.111 
																																																								
105 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
106 Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
107 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 678 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court “openly 
flouts our well-established duty to respect the Executive’s judgment in matters of 
military operations and foreign affairs”). 
108 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 154 (D.D.C. 2004). 
109 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (majority opinion). 
110 Id. at 557. 
111 Id. at 567. Four justices would also have held that conspiracy was not a crime 
under the international law of armed conflict.  Id. at 610 (plurality opinion).  
Because the extant support for the military commissions was limited to those 
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Within six months of that decision, Congress responded by 
passing the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”),112 which addressed 
the defects noted by the Court.113  New charges were preferred under 
the new law,114 and it was these that ultimately led to Hamdan’s 
convictions.115  Of great interest at the time was the perceived lenity 
of the sentence imposed by the commission: the decision to grant 
credit for time served before trial meant that Hamdan would be 
eligible for release before President Bush even left office.116  And 
although there remained the possibility that the United States would 
continue to detain Hamdan as a combatant after he served his 
punishment, the United States ultimately transferred Hamdan to 
Yemen in November 2008.117  
After his release, however, Hamdan did not stop fighting.  
He continued to seek post-conviction relief,118 arguing that even the 
new charges were unsound as a matter of domestic and international 
																																																																																																																					
offenses triable by statute or by the law of war, and no statute then authorized trials 
by military commissions for conspiracy, these justices would have held conspiracy to 
be beyond the reach of military commissions.  Two other justices joined Justice 
Thomas’ dissent on this point.  Id. at 697-98.  Justice Kennedy would not have 
decided this question.  Id. at 655 (noting that "Congress may choose to provide 
further guidance in this area").  Chief Justice Roberts, having been a member of the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that decided the case below, did not 
participate.  
112 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w (2006). 
113 Responding, perhaps, to Justice Kennedy, the Military Commissions Act provided 
for the trial of conspiracy as a criminal offense.  10 U.S.C. § 950 t(29). 
114 Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1243-44 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
115 Id. at 1240-41 (stating that he was sentenced to sixty-six months of confinement, 
with credit for time served). 
116 Military Judge Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration and Re-Sentencing, P-009 
(Oct. 29, 2008).  It seems to have been the decision to grant pretrial confinement 
credit that most troubled the government, who appealed this point and lost.  Id. 
117 Robert F. Worth, Bin Laden Driver to Be Sent to Yemen, N.Y. TIMES  
(Nov. 25, 2008).  According to Prof. Charles Schmitz, an expert in Yemen who 
assisted his legal team, reports that Hamdan is still living in Yemen as of the time of 
this writing, “struggling like the rest of Yemen to make ends meet during the war.”  
E-mail from Charles Schmitz, Professor, Towson University, to author  
(Aug. 19, 2015) (on file with the author). 
118 Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1241. 
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law.119  Using the appellate right granted by the MCA,120 he asked the 
D.C. Circuit Court to overturn of his conviction.121  That Court 
agreed with him that the offenses with which he had been charged 
did not, in fact, violate the law governing armed conflict.122  
The D.C. Circuit Court, in Hamdan’s second trip through 
the federal courts (“Hamdan II”), concluded that Congress had not 
intended to authorize punishment by military commissions for acts 
that preceded the enactment of the MCA, if those acts were not 
already criminalized under the international law of war. 123  
Determining that material support for terrorism was in fact a new 
offense, the Court reversed Hamdan’s conviction and sentence.124  As 
a legal matter, the most celebrated military commission victory 
quietly became another defeat for the government. 
2. The Many Cases of al Bahlul 
Ironically, Hamdan’s victory may ultimately be limited to 
him personally.  The most recent round of battles involved Ali 
Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul.125  Like Hamdan, he had been 
close personally to Osama bin Laden.  Unlike Hamdan, who was 
primarily a driver,126 Bahlul was a more senior official in Al Qaeda, 
serving as a media producer for the organization. 127   After the 
destroyer USS Cole was attacked in 2000, Bahlul prepared a video 
based on the attack for recruiting other potential jihadists for Al 
																																																								
119 Id. at 1244 (explaining that the military commissions had acquitted Hamdan of 
the sole specification of conspiracy, but convicted him of five specifications of the 
charge of material support for terrorism). 
120 10 U.S.C. § 950g (2012).  The statute grants to that court “exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine the validity of a final judgment rendered by a military commission (as 
approved by the convening authority and, where applicable, as affirmed or set aside 
as incorrect in law by the United States Court of Military Commission Review).”  Id.  
121 Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1241. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 1247 (stating that "[c]ongress believed that the Act codified no new crimes 
and thus posed no ex post facto problem"). 
124 Id. at 1250 (explaining that "the issue here is whether material support for 
terrorism is an international-law war crime.  The answer is no."). 
125 See Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
126 Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1242. 
127 Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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Qaeda.128  Bin Laden was sufficiently impressed that Bahlul became 
the primary public relations officer for the organization, and he 
prepared the “martyrs' wills” for two of the September 11 hijackers, 
Mohammed Atta and Ziad al Jarrah.129  
By December 2001, Pakistani officials had captured Bahlul 
and turned him over to the United States.130  In 2004, the United 
States charged him in a military commission with conspiracy to 
commit war crimes, 131  but the trial was delayed pending the 
resolution of Hamdan’s case through the federal court system.132  
After the Hamdan decision in the Supreme Court, and 
subsequent passage of the MCA, the government preferred charges 
corresponding to some of the offenses in the statute: conspiracy and 
solicitation to commit war crimes, and the provision of material 
support to a terrorist organization.133  
Significantly, the conspiracy and solicitation offenses 
included specifications that fit both categories of law of war 
violations.  On the one hand, the charges included grave breaches 
such as murder of protected persons.134  On the other hand, the 
charge sheet made reference to belligerent acts: Bahlul’s conspiracy 
to commit “murder in violation of the law of war” and “destruction 
																																																								
128 Id. at 5-6. 
129 Id. at 6. 
130 Id. 
131 In the first set of proceedings, under the presidential order, al Bahlul was charged 
only with conspiracy.  See Review of Charge and Recommendation at 4-7, United 
States v. Al Bahlul (June 28, 2004).  That charge, though, included specific references 
to grave breaches such as "attacking civilians" and "attacking civilian objects," as well 
as belligerency offenses such as "murder by an unprivileged belligerent" and 
"destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent."  Id. at 5-6. 
132 Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 6. 
133 Id. at 6-7. 
134 Appellate Ex. 059 at 1-2, United States v. Al Bahlul [hereinafter Flyer].  A "flyer" is 
the document provided by prosecutors to military panels in courts-martial and 
commission proceedings that provides the final form of the charges against the 
accused without the other information contained on the charge sheet.  See Danielle 
Tarin, Rules and Law Governing Flyers, Cleansed Charge Sheets, and Flimsies, ARMY 
LAW., June 2013 at 25, 27. 
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of property in violation of the law of war.”135  Although the title of 
these offenses suggests that they may not be mere belligerency 
offenses, the text of the statute makes clear that they are.136  
Bahlul pleaded not guilty, asserting that the military 
commission had no authority to try him.137  He nonetheless freely 
admitted to the factual basis of the charges.138  The commission, 
unsurprisingly, convicted him of all three charges and sentenced him 
to confinement for life.139  For the government, the story of Bahlul 
seemed to have ended well.  But the story had only begun. 
Only Hamdan has had a more complex judicial journey than 
al Bahlul.140  As noted, a panel of the D.C. Circuit had already 
decided in Hamdan II that material support for terrorism was not a 
crime under international law, and hence was not triable for events 
that occurred before the passage of the MCA.141  Because Bahlul's 
conviction included two other offenses, this decision did not end his 
story as it had Hamdan’s.  A panel of the D.C. Circuit first 
determined that all three of the offenses fell because of the logic of 
the Hamdan II opinion, as the existence of none of the three 
predated the MCA.142  
																																																								
135 Flyer, supra note 134, at 1. 
136 For example, the statute defines the former as "[a]ny person subject to this 
chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons, including privileged belligerents, 
in violation of the law of war . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 950t (15) (2009) (emphasis added).  
The only reason for the inclusion of the italicized language is to ensure that the 
military commissions will consider the attack on a legitimate target, when done by 
an unprivileged person, to be a crime. 
137 Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 7. 
138 Id.  His trial was never a model of a professional justice system: he attempted to 
fire his lawyers and proceed pro se, but then absented himself from the proceedings 
on several occasions by refusing to leave his cell; he made neither opening statement 
nor closing argument, never objected to any prosecution evidence, and presented no 
defense.  Id.  
139 Id. at 7-8. 
140 At the time of writing, al Bahlul’s legal journey is not yet complete.  
141 Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 8. 
142 Id. 
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The full court then took up the case en banc.143  It agreed that 
neither solicitation 144  nor material support were a part of the 
international law of armed conflict, although it expressly purported 
to overturn Hamdan II in doing so. 145   The Court found that 
Congress had, in fact, expressly intended to criminalize conduct that 
occurred before passage of the MCA, but in doing so had violated the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.  It found that by importing material support 
for terrorism and solicitation into the jurisdiction of the military 
commissions, Congress had violated that clause of the Constitution 
because these offenses had historically not been “triable by military 
commissions” under the law of armed conflict.  Hence, those two 
offenses only became triable upon the enactment of the MCA.  It was 
thus plain error to convict Bahlul of offenses that only became 
offenses when Congress acted in 2006, five years after the United 
States took him into custody.146 
The full court disagreed about conspiracy, however, finding 
that the conspiracy charge avoided an Ex Post Facto problem because 
other U.S. criminal laws already prohibited the conduct at issue.147  It 
also concluded that conspiracy was triable as an offense under the 
law of war, or at least that it was not plain error that it was not 
triable.148  This result thus disposed of two of the charges against 
Bahlul, but in upholding the other, it did so against only one 
challenge, the argument that its promulgation in the MCA was an Ex 
Post Facto violation.  The en banc court then remanded the case to 
																																																								
143 Id.  
144 Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 30. 
145 Id. at 29. 
146 Id. at 31. 
147 Id. at 18 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2332b (2015); the court noted that military 
commissions cannot try violations of this statute, but held that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause does not limit procedural changes like forum). 
148 Id. at 10 (The court used the "plain error" standard because it found al Bahlul to 
have waived any objection based on the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Although he objected 
to the characterization of his acts as crimes, the Court of Appeals found that this was 
not a question of law but "because they were inspired by religious fervor."  This was 
despite the fact that the pro se litigant had objected to "the meaningless American 
laws" as an attempt to rewrite divine laws.). 
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the original panel to consider Bahlul’s other challenges against the 
surviving conspiracy charge.149 
The other shoe dropped for the government during that 
remand.  A divided panel held that conspiracy was also a flawed 
charge.150  The majority held that there was insufficient historical 
practice supporting the trial of offenses such as conspiracy before 
military commissions.151  Lacking evidence of such practice, Congress 
was not free to assign the judicial power of this trial to a purely 
executive organization such as a military commission.152  The court 
struck down the sole remaining charge, and with that, Bahlul’s 
conviction by military commission went the way of those of David 
Hicks and Salim Hamdan. 
III. THE ENEMY WITHIN: WHY THE PROSECUTION KEEPS LOSING 
 A somewhat surprising theme running throughout these 
cases is that many of these defeats have been handed to the military 
commission prosecutors by federal appellate judges. 153   Perhaps 
emboldened by the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Hamdan154 
																																																								
149 Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 31 (he argued that Congress had exceeded its authority by 
defining crimes that were not recognized by the law of armed conflict, that the MCA 
violated Article III of the Constitution by allowing these same offenses to be tried, 
that his conviction violated the First Amendment, and that subjecting only aliens to 
the jurisdiction of the military commissions violated the Equal Protection clause.). 
150 Al-Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
151 Id. at 36. 
152 Id. (Because such an assignment of judicial power to the executive branch violated 
the structural requirements of Article III, the court concluded, it was not subject to 
waiver, which had led the en banc court to reject the challenge to the conspiracy 
charge.  Here the court applied a de novo review, which caused one of the judges 
who joined the opinion rejecting the Ex Post Facto challenge in 2014 to also join the 
opinion vacating the conspiracy conviction in 2015.  (Tatel, J., concurring)). 
153 But federal appellate judges have not handed all of the defeats out.  Earlier in the 
proceedings it was military judges who were finding that the procedures did not 
comport with the law.  See United States v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 (2007) (reversing 
decision by the military commission judge dismissing all charges sua sponte based 
on lack of personal jurisdiction, because the Combatant Status Review Tribunal had 
only found Khadr to be an alien enemy combatant, but not an alien unlawful enemy 
combatant). 
154 See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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and Boumedienne,155 a series of panels have been fairly consistent in 
rejecting the government’s view of the law of armed conflict.156  This 
is unusual, both because courts tend to be more deferential to the 
executive in areas of military and international operations,157 and 
because a large number of well-respected commentators and scholars 
have advanced the government’s position.158  These defeats clustered 
around what seem to be two separate legal arguments, one over 
material support to terrorist organizations and the other over 
conspiracy as an offense in international law.  These two strands are 
actually part of the divide between belligerency offenses and grave 
breaches, and that the unwillingness of the courts to countenance the 
stubbornly advanced government view in this area provided a series 
of defeats that ultimately rebounded to the benefit of the United 
States. 
																																																								
155 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (recognizing a right of habeas corpus 
for detainees and holding that the Military Commissions Act was an 
unconstitutional suspension of that right). 
156 Frakt, supra note 35, at 762. 
157 See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 700 (2008) (“it is for the political branches, 
not the Judiciary, to assess practices in foreign countries and to determine national 
policy in light of those assessments); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) 
("Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere 
with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in 
judicial matters"). 
158 The latest round of litigation in the case of al Bahlul saw the filing of amici briefs 
supporting the government by, inter alia, Professors Peter Margulies, Geoff Corn, 
Chris Jenks, and Eric Talbot Jensen, as well as former military judge advocates from 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force: retired Major Generals John D. Altenburg, Michael 
J. Marchand, Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., Rear Admiral Steven B. Kantrowitz, and 
Brigadier General Thomas L. Hemingway.  Brief of Amici Curiae Former 
Government Officials, Former Military Lawyers, and Scholars of National Security 
Law in Support of Respondent as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Al Bahlul 
v. United States, 412 U.S. App. D.C. 372 (No. 11-1324); Brief of John D. Altenburg, 
Maj. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.), Steven B. Kantrowitz, Rear Adm., JAGC, U.S. Navy 
(Ret.), Michael J. Marchand, Maj. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.), Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., 
Maj. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.), Thomas L. Hemingway, Brig. Gen., U.S. Air Force 
(Ret.), Washington Legal Foundation, and Allied Educational Foundation as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Supporting Affirmance as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Al Bahlul v. United States, 412 U.S. App. D.C. 372  
(No. 11-1324).  
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A. The Rejection of Material Support 
As hinted at in the handful of cases that travelled the pipeline 
through the military commissions, the battle over whether a charge 
of material support is triable by such a commission was a significant 
reason that the effort proceeded at such a glacial pace.  This offense, 
codified in 18 U.S.C. 2339A,159 allows prosecutors to incapacitate 
participants in potential terrorist schemes of foreign organizations.160  
Although it has a solid foundation in the American criminal law 
context, 161  its inclusion in the initial list of punishable offenses 
published by the Secretary of Defense was odd.  Certainly military 
commissions had never used a charge like material support for 
terrorism before.  The inclusion of a wholly new crime, one based so 
completely on U.S. domestic law, seemed to violate the notion that 
military commissions existed to try offenses against the law of armed 
conflict.162  Many commentators were puzzled, or even outraged, and 
the legal community never suggested that it welcomed this 
development.163 
																																																								
159 18 U.S.C. 2339A (2009).  The parallel offense was made punishable by the 
Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. §950t (25) (2009).  The companion civilian 
offenses, including the frequently used Providing Material Support or Resources to 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, were not included in the MCA. 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B (2015). 
160 See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 13-15 (2005) (discussing the passage 
of the initial version of the law after the first attack on the World Trade Center, and 
its expansion to criminalize more activities by supporters of terrorist organizations). 
161 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7 (2010) (upholding the 
companion §2339B against a challenge based on the First Amendment). 
162 Margulies, supra note 13, at 67-68 (rejecting the view advanced by the 
government in the al Bahlul appeals that a separate "domestic" law of armed conflict 
allowed the U.S. to import into military commissions domestic offenses not 
recognized in the international law of armed conflict). 
163 See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act  
of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 56-57 (2007); 
David J. R. Frakt, Applying International Fair Trial Standards to the Military 
Commissions of Guantanamo, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 551, 596-97 (2013); Jonathan 
Hafetz, Policing the Line: International Law, Article III, and the Constitutional Limits 
of Military Jurisdiction, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 681 (2014); David Weissbrodt and Andrea 
W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military Commissions in Light of 
Common Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 LAW & INEQ. 353, 400 (2008).  
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Material support as a charge was novel, but it was also easy 
to understand, and perhaps even easier to plead to.164  Perhaps 
because it required no specific malevolent act by the accused,165 it was 
the charge selected by Hicks and Khadr as the basis for the guilty 
pleas that would ultimately return them to their home countries.166  
The military commissions, like the courts-martial system, require the 
judge to inquire into the providence, the voluntariness and factual 
basis, of a guilty plea.167  
Additionally, because the key players drafting the rules for 
the military commissions were military lawyers, they transferred to 
the military commissions the court-martial practice of allowing168 the 
accused to agree with the prosecution on a confessional stipulation of 
fact.169  The stipulation and the providence inquiry by the judge 
																																																																																																																					
Even active military officers were less than supportive of the decision to include this 
offense.  See Maj. Dana M. Hollywood, Redemption Deferred: Military Commissions 
in the War on Terror and the Charge of Providing Material Support for Terrorism, 36 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).  
164 For an offense before a law of war tribunal, the elements for this offense are as 
anodyne as can be.  Although one variant on the offense of providing material 
support for terrorism requires that the accused knew or intended that the provided 
resources would be used for carrying out an act of terrorism, the other requires the 
government to show only that the accused knew that the organization to which he 
provided resources had engaged in terrorism at some time.  MANUAL FOR MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS, pt. IV ¶ 20 (2012) [hereinafter MMC].  
165 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2010). 
166 See Omar Khadr Returns to Canada, CBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2012, 6:43 AM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/omar-khadr-returns-to-canada-1.937754; Barbara 
McMahon, Guantanamo Detainee Flies Back to Jail in Australia, THE GUARDIAN 
(May 21, 2007, 6:57 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/21/ 
australia.guantanamo. 
167 Although the very extensive inquiry into a court-martial guilty plea before the 
judge will accept it mandated by United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969), 
it is labeled “impracticable” by the governing regulation.  See MMC, supra note 164, 
at pt. II, 910(e).  Compare the requirements set forth by that rule with the 
corresponding rule for courts-martial, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 
STATES, R.C.M. 910 (2012) [hereinafter MCM], and its implementation in the 
fifteen-page script for courts-martial, U.S. Dep’t of Army, Pam. 27-9, MILITARY 
JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK ¶¶ 2-2-1 to 2-2-8 (10 Sep. 2014) [hereinafter DA Pam. 27-9]. 
168 In practice, "allowing" could be read as "requiring," as agreement to submit such a 
stipulation is generally a non-negotiable position of the United States in the pretrial 
negotiations.  See, e.g., Hicks ROT, supra note 67, at 124-26. 
169 MCM, supra note 167, pt. II, 705(b)(1). 
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might have been very difficult for an accused if he was asked to 
confess that he had committed genocide or some other grave breach 
of international law.  It was undoubtedly much easier to admit, as 
Hicks did, that he “guarded a Taliban tank” and that “every day 
received food, drink, and updates on what was happening from the 
fat Al Qaeda leader in charge who was on a bicycle.”170  Khadr found 
it possible to admit that he was not a member of a militia or other 
armed force, that he trained to support Al Qaeda, that he planted 
Improvised Explosive Devices, and that he participated in a firefight 
in which he killed an American soldier and was himself wounded.171  
Such stipulations and pleas could later be explained in polite society, 
and would not necessarily brand the confessant as a bad person, in 
contrast to someone who signed a stipulation confessing to a grave 
breach of international humanitarian law. 
The appellate process changed the nature of all of that 
precedent.  Hamdan’s conviction was solely for material support.  
Thus, his appellate challenge concerned only the legitimacy of 
material support for terrorism as a charge in military commissions.  
Because the D.C. Circuit held that it was not, the foundation stone 
for this entire run of prosecutions was jeopardized.172  That decision 
was overturned by the en banc D.C. Circuit, but only by substituting 
an even more firm prohibition on the use of material support charges 
in military commissions.173  As the battle shifted to an argument over 
conspiracy, the United States may have allowed the exclusion of 
material support from military commissions.174  
																																																								
170 Stipulation of Fact at 5, United States v. Hicks (Mar. 29, 2007).  Hicks also 
admitted to receiving training and spending two hours on the frontline near 
Konduz, Afghanistan, before it collapsed in the face of an armored assault by the 
Northern Alliance.  Nothing in the stipulation even hints at responsibility by Hicks 
for any acts that this article would label grave breaches.  Id. 
171 United States v. Khadr, Stipulation of Fact, Prosecution Ex. 12, 13 (Oct. 2010)  
p. 1, 5, 8. 
172 Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
173 Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
174 See, e.g., Hicks, CMCR 13-004 at 2 (the government’s position in the most recent 
Hicks litigation that if it lost the argument that Hicks had waived his right to 
appellate review, the Court of Military Commission Review “should decline to affirm 
the findings and sentence.”)  But c.f. Corn and Jenks, supra note 13, at 41-42 
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B. The Government’s Odd Choice Regarding Conspiracy 
1. The Recent Confusion about Conspiracy  
When Hamdan challenged his ongoing military 
commissions,175 the nature of his liability for the crimes charged was 
among the objections he raised. 176   When his case reached the 
Supreme Court, 177  the opinion’s conclusion that the system 
procedurally violated the military commission statutes that Congress 
had long before passed178 meant that the Court did not need to 
resolve the inchoate crimes issue.179  Nonetheless, a four justice 
plurality (of eight, as Chief Justice Roberts had sat on the D.C. 
Circuit panel that had heard the case below)180  would have held that 
conspiracy was not a crime under the law of armed conflict—and 
conspiracy was a much more defensible charge than material 
support. 181  The Hamdan opinion did not ultimately address the 
availability of material support, but because the opinion necessitated 
Congressional action, it did not matter.  Congress acted that fall, and 
by December 2006, President Bush was able to sign the MCA.182  This 
act not only resolved the objections of the Hamdan majority, it also 
attempted to insulate both detention and military commissions from 
future judicial review through habeas corpus, 183  and specifically 
																																																																																																																					
(acknowledging the limitations imposed upon material support charges in these 
cases by the Ex Post Facto clause but arguing that "when Congress legislates 
prospectively in this exigent area, deference and historic practice should usually 
trump the Article III concerns"). 
175 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C. 2004). 
176 Id. 
177 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
178 References to military commissions had been made in Article 15 of the 1920 
Articles of War, and were carried forward into its successor, the 1951 Uniform Code 
of Military Justice.  See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006). 
179 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613. 
180 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
181 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 610. 
182 M.C.A., supra note 15. 
183 Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva 
Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 322, 330 (2007).  This was the provision struck down 
in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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included both conspiracy 184  and material support for terrorist 
organizations185 as punishable offenses. 
While the rejection by federal judges of material support for 
terrorism as an appropriate feature of law of war military 
commissions has been swift and consistent, conspiracy has been 
more complicated.  Two historical examples have exacerbated the 
confusion: the Lincoln and Nuremberg trials.  At each of these 
tribunals, conspiracy was a featured offense, and each was, at least 
arguably, a law of war military commission. 
The Lincoln trials were built entirely on the charge of 
conspiracy.186  Despite criticism for other reasons, they remain a 
precedent of outsized influence.  Notably, in the dispute over the 
nature of conspiracy, judges of the D.C. Circuit sparred over their 
meaning.  In the Bahlul case’s 2014 trek to en banc review,187 Judge 
Henderson, for the Court, observed that the Lincoln conspirator trial 
occurred well before the passage of the statute that allowed military 
commissions to try cases arising under the law of war.188  This 
demonstrated that Congress “was no doubt familiar with at least one 
high-profile example of a conspiracy charge tried by a military 
commission.”189  Thus the Court concluded that convicting Bahlul of 
conspiracy did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 190   Judge 
Kavanaugh agreed: just as Dr. Samuel Mudd191 could be convicted of 
																																																								
184 10 U.S.C. § 950t (29) (2006). 
185 10 U.S.C. § 950t (25) (2006). 
186 Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
187 A panel of the circuit having vacated the convictions by the military commission 
based on the circuit's holding in Hamdan's 2012 case that such convictions violated 
the Ex Post Facto clause.  Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 8. 
188 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).  
189 Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 25. 
190 Id. at 18.  Because the Court found that he had forfeited this challenge to the 
commissions, it only applied a plain error standard in concluding that it was not 
plain that conspiracy was not triable by a law of war military commission.  Id. 
191 See Mudd v. Caldera, 134 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001) (a challenge by Dr. 
Mudd's descendants seeking a correction of the military record that would require 
the Secretary of the Army to clear the doctor's record of conviction.  The Court 
found that Dr. Mudd was triable as one who was an accessory after the fact by aiding 
and abetting John Wilkes Booth); aff'd on other grounds, Mudd v. White, 309  
F.3d 819 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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conspiracy to commit a war crime, so too could Bahlul.192  Dissenting 
on this point, Judge Rogers responded that the Lincoln trials added 
nothing to the government’s position; the conspirators were not 
charged with inchoate conspiracy, as the single charge noted that 
they had not only conspired but also completed the “offense of 
maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously murdering the said 
Abraham Lincoln.”193  
The following year, the panel weighing Bahlul’s separation of 
power challenge against the surviving conspiracy charge again found 
need to consult the Lincoln precedent.194  This time, the Court split 
over the question whether that tribunal was properly considered a 
pure law of war commission, or one that also had a martial law 
source of jurisdiction, which would allow it to consider purely 
domestic crimes, such as conspiracy.  With a century and a half of 
hindsight, the court might also have noted that there is arguably a 
limited amount of precedential value that should be drawn from a 
hastily convened trial designed to ensure the conviction of those 
believed responsible for the loss of the beloved leader who had just 
suppressed an insurrection threatening the very existence of the 
nation.  As Justice Jackson noted in a similarly tense time, albeit in a 
wildly different context, military actions do not always “conform to 
conventional tests of constitutionality.”195 
2. The Lincoln Trial’s Use of Conspiracy  
Judge Rogers is correct that the trial of the Lincoln 
conspirators can only be fairly read to allow conspiracy as a form of 
liability for an offense that is completed.196  What is more, the 
																																																								
192 Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 69 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("The Lincoln conspirators were expressly charged with and convicted of 
conspiracy") (emphasis in original). 
193 Id. at 44 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
194 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
195 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  At 
issue in that instance was the exclusion order during World War II that punished 
American citizens of Japanese descent that formed the basis of the conviction of 
Toyosaburo (Fred) Korematsu. 
196 Ex parte Mudd, 17 F. Cas. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1868) (rejecting Dr. Mudd's habeas 
petition after presuming guilt of the "charge on which they were convicted -- of a 
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conspiracy charged was not only of a completed offense, but an 
offense that would today be characterized as a grave breach.  The 
killing of the president, in a civilian theater behind the lines of battle 
and after the surrender of virtually every major force in the field,197 
was a violation of the rules of war.198   The Lincoln conspiracy 
hearings stand out for their unique nature, but do not establish a 
broader principle that inchoate conspiracy, especially as to 
belligerency offenses, is triable by military commissions.  This is 
especially so in the absence of evidence of trials by military 
commission of any member of the Confederate government for 
recruiting, supporting, or deploying any of the irregular forces who 
were themselves potentially subject to trial. 
3. The Limitations of Conspiracy at Nuremburg  
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for the 
Trial of Major War Criminals provides the clearest view of the 
reaction of the global community to the use of conspiracy for law of 
armed conflict violations.  During the planning for the tribunal, the 
American lawyers included conspiracy as an offense.199  The hope 
																																																																																																																					
conspiracy to commit the military crime which one of their number did commit") 
(emphasis added). 
197 HERMAN HATTAWAY & ARCHER JONES, HOW THE NORTH WON: A MILITARY 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 676 (1983).  Although Joseph Johnston's force vainly 
attempting to slow Sherman's trek through North Carolina did not surrender until 
two days after the assassination, the collapsing Confederate government had already 
ordered that they do so.  Id. 
198 Attorney General Speed, in his opinion on the propriety of a military tribunal for 
the conspirators, does not suggest otherwise.  Although it is true that he expounded 
at length on the nature of "secret participants in the hostilities," what this article has 
been characterizing as those who commit belligerency offenses, it was only to show 
that such persons were triable even when the civil courts were open. For the offense, 
he turned to Vattel, who he quoted for the proposition that assassination was "an 
offense against the laws of war, and a great crime.”  “Opinion on the Constitutional 
Power of the Military to Try and Execute the Assassins of the President," 11 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 297 (1865).  Of course, as the title suggests, and Judge Henderson 
conceded, the Speed opinion was written after the fact, and might be read as 
rationalization of actions already taken.  Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 25 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
199 Elizabeth Borgwardt, Re-Examining Nuremberg as a New Deal Institution: Politics, 
Culture and the Limits of Law in Generating Human Rights Norms, 23 BERKELEY J. 
INT'L L. 401, 433 (2005). 
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and expectation was that the first group of trials could establish the 
liability, as conspirators, of both the major leaders of Germany and of 
several organizations.  Subsequent trials of rank-and-file members 
could then follow, with the prosecution’s responsibilities limited to 
showing membership by the accused in one of these organizations 
that had been pronounced a criminal conspiracy.200 
As several onlookers attested, the inclusion of conspiracy 
caused consternation among the allies.  The French in particular 
were disturbed by the possible extension of criminal liability through 
a doctrine that threatened to make small players in the system liable 
for the deeds of the great.201  Nonetheless, the trial proceeded with 
conspiracy as an independent count alongside those for crimes 
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.202 
When the verdict was read, it appeared that the judges had 
severely limited the role of conspiracy.203  The judgment consolidated 
the first two counts, those of conspiracy and crimes against peace, 
and limited its consideration to “whether a concrete plan to wage war 
existed, and determin[ing] the participants in that concrete plan.”204  
In so doing, they overtly rejected the argument by the prosecution 
that conspiracy extended liability to everyone who had participated 
significantly in the Nazi Party or German government. 205  
Furthermore, although the prosecution argued that the concept of 
conspiracy extended to the other counts of the indictment, war 
																																																								
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 437. 
202 Indictment, in I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 1946, 27-68 
(1947). 
203 A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court characterized the tribunal's treatment of 
conspiracy by noting that it "pointedly refused" to recognize conspiracy to commit 
war crimes as a violation of the law of armed conflict, despite the prosecution asking 
it to do so.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 610 (2006). 
204 Two Hundred and Seventeenth Day, Monday, 30 September 1946, Afternoon 
Session: The Law as to Common Plan or Conspiracy, in XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 
NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 1946, 467-68 (1947) [hereinafter The Law as to 
Common Plan or Conspiracy]. 
205 Id. at 467.  
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crimes and crimes against humanity,206 the tribunal rejected this 
notion as beyond the scope of the Charter.207 
One way to distinguish the charge of waging aggressive war 
from the charges of war crimes, or crimes against humanity, is that 
small players can play no serious role in the waging of an aggressive 
war.  To be a part of the “concrete plan” to initiate a war of 
aggression requires that one be a significant player in the 
governmental control of the nation.  To kill or torture a prisoner, or 
to participate in genocide, requires no particular amount of power 
within the nation.  By limiting conspiratorial liability in this way, the 
Nuremberg Tribunal prevented the creation of a regime in which 
mere membership in the National Socialist Party would establish 
criminal liability.  Thus, the Nuremburg Tribunal approved of 
conspiracy as a violation of international law, but only in so 
restricted a form that the plan of massive subsequent trials simply did 
not occur.208  After the trial, it became a commonplace understanding 
of international criminal law that conspiracy, as understood by the 
United States, had no role in international law.209 
4. Conspiracy-Like Liability 
Yet it is also true that some international trials have featured 
forms of criminal liability that look something like conspiracy.  Both 
command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise bear some 
resemblance to the conspiracy, and both have solid footing in 
international law.  Ultimately, however each requires that offenses be 
completed, is limited to use only in the area of grave breaches, and 
neither has ever played a role in a belligerency offense. 
																																																								
206 Borgwardt, supra note 199, at 440. 
207 The Law as to Common Plan or Conspiracy, supra note 204, at 469. 
208 The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: 
What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1208 (2009) (noting that in 
the first major consideration of the issue in the subsequent proceedings to the Trial 
of the Major War Criminals, the court dismissed the conspiracy charges after 
argument by counsel but without a written opinion). 
209 Id. at 1100 (noting that the statute governing the International Criminal Court 
does not include conspiracy "largely at the insistence of lawyers from civil law 
countries, whose domestic traditions generally do not include criminal or civil 
liability for conspiracy"). 
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a. Command Responsibility  
Command responsibility is the requirement of the law of war 
that commanders bear actual liability for the wrongdoing of their 
subordinates.210  The classic statement of such criminality is that 
commanders are responsible for the deeds of their subordinates if 
they order them before the fact or ratify them after.211  This type of 
liability is common, and is seen not only in areas such as the 
international law of war, but even the rules of responsibility for 
attorneys in the United States.212  Law of armed conflict command 
responsibility goes far, however, by also encompassing to those who 
know of wrongdoing by subordinates and fail to prevent it,213 or, in 
one particularly strong version, those who merely should know of the 
wrongdoing, even if they do not.214  Whichever version of command 
																																																								
210 Danner & Martinez, supra note 36, at 120. 
211 So, for example, the International Criminal Court uses a standard of liability that 
makes criminally responsible any person who "Orders, solicits or induces the 
commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted."  Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
212 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (declaring 
responsibility for a lawyer for the actions of another if the former lawyer "orders, or 
with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved"). 
213 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 211, at art. 28 
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and 
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his 
or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.  
214 The very strong version perhaps received affirmation in Yamashita.  Many 
scholars have read the finding of guilt in that case to stand for the proposition that 
General Yamashita was legitimately punished for the sins of his troops even though 
he might not have known of them.  See, e.g., Major Bruce D. Landrum, The 
Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now, 149 MIL. L. 
REV. 293, 297 (1995) (noting that some had described Yamashita as "a victim, an 
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responsibility one uses, however, it extends no liability to drivers, 
foot soldiers, or even propagandists for crimes committed by others.  
It thus offers no aid to the government in trials like those of 
Hamdan, Khadr, and Bahlul. 
b. Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability  
Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”), on the other hand, does 
hold liable those who are not major players in their military force.215  
It resembles conspiracy in applying to all participants in the criminal 
activity.216  It does that so thoroughly that the dissenting judge in the 
most recent decision in the Bahlul case argued that conspiracy was 
an international law of armed conflict offense, merely passing under 
the name JCE.217  This is incorrect, however: while conspirators are, 
under the common law, liable for any offense committed by any 
member of the conspiracy at any time, provided only that the offense 
fits within the design of the conspiracy,218 JCE is much narrower.  It 
is never a stand-alone form of liability.219  Additionally, even the 
most wide-ranging form of JCE announced by international 
																																																																																																																					
'honourable Japanese general' tried and executed on 'trumped-up charges,' the 
subject of a 'legalized lynching.'"  (citations omitted)).  On the other hand, it is 
difficult to say with certainty what Yamashita meant in the minds of those who 
decided the case: the panel functioned as a jury in that case, and issued an opinion 
that, as one scholar of the law of war noted, is subject to at least four interpretations, 
but none truly announced strict liability for commanders.  Major William H. Parks, 
Command Responsibility For War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1973). 
215 Danner & Martinez, supra note 36, at 104 (describing Tadic, the person on trial 
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in whose case 
the doctrine was expounded, as "an enthusiastic but relatively low-level participant 
in the crimes that occurred in Bosnia in the early 1990s"). 
216 Id. at 103. 
217 Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., 
dissenting). 
218 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (rejecting the argument that 
evidence of direct participation by a conspirator was necessary for that conspirator’s 
conviction of a substantive offense committed by the conspiracy because “Each 
conspirator instigated the commission of the crime.  The unlawful agreement 
contemplated precisely what was done.  It was formed for the purpose.  The act done 
was in execution of the enterprise.”). 
219 Danner & Martinez, supra note 36, at 118. 
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tribunals limits liability of accused to those acts that are a “natural 
and foreseeable consequence” of the common purpose.220 
It is true that the lack of formally outlined doctrinal limits 
might well allow future international tribunals to expand the net of 
this form of liability to match the remarkable scope of Anglo-
American conspiracy law; it is also true that no international tribunal 
has done so.221  Instead, the actual use of JCE has paralleled the way it 
was used by the Allies after World War II: in a series of cases trying 
persons for abuse of prisoners, there was clear evidence that a small 
group of defendants had committed a series of a bad acts, but no way 
to identify which individual committed which act.222 
Although both command responsibility and JCE share 
features with conspiracy, they do so only with conspiracy as a form of 
liability for completed offenses.  There is no precedent in the 
international law of armed conflict for conspiracy as a form of 
liability for an offense that is only in the planning stages.  The 
successful domestic prosecutions of terrorists such as Ramzi Yousef, 
convicted and sentenced to life for a plot to destroy a passenger 
aircraft crossing the Pacific Ocean, would not have been possible in a 
military commission.223  Furthermore, although the words used by 
																																																								
220 Id. at 106 (quoting the Tadic case from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia). 
221 Id. at 150 (noting that an expansion of JCE to hold liable a small player "for all the 
crimes visited upon Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s would seem patently unjust" 
but that "no convictions representing such a gross extension of liability have yet been 
entered"). 
222 Id. at 111.  Professors Danner and Martinez, wary of a possible expansion of JCE, 
acknowledged that this sufficiently paralleled the Tadic case that announced JCE to 
justify that conviction, but warned that the language of the court was so broad that it 
might be misused to the detriment of the legitimacy of the international legal system.  
Id. at 167 (Liability theories that distort the contribution of individual defendants to 
the crimes that ultimately occurred run the risk, over time, of producing a record of 
a violent period that fails to capture how and why the crimes occurred").  
223 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 79 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing Yousef's 
conviction for conspiracy in a plot to destroy twelve U.S.-flagged aircraft with time 
bombs after they left Asia).  This act of terror did not occur because Yousef and a co-
conspirator inadvertently started a fire in their apartment, and responding 
authorities discovered both the laptop containing the plan and many of the 
chemicals needed to carry it out. 
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international tribunals would conceivably support an extension of 
liability to minor members for every crime committed by any 
member of their organization, those same international tribunals 
have consistently rejected the notion that the liability they were 
imposing paralleled conspiracy or membership in a criminal 
organization.224  
5. The Limits of Conspiracy-Like Liability in Military 
       Commissions  
These two forms of liability apply only to grave breaches.  
This is powerfully illustrated by the use of the doctrine of command 
responsibility at Nuremberg and in the years since.  It was utterly 
uncontroversial to hold leaders of the Nazi regime liable for offenses 
committed by those under their control.225  Indeed, although some of 
the accused on trial after World War II argued that they were only 
subordinates, and that criminal liability did not apply to those who 
were “just following orders,” the defense did not save its major 
proponents.226  There does not seem to have been a defense of “just 
giving orders” proffered by the accused at the Trial of Major War 
Criminals or the subsequent proceedings.  Command responsibility 
for grave breaches may have been one of the most consistently 
accepted features of the Nuremberg trials.  
Yet there also does not seem to have been an attempt by the 
victorious Allies to punish any of those who ran the machinery 
responsible for recruiting, training, and deploying those individuals 
who were themselves convicted of belligerency offenses.  Although 
several of the leaders of the Abwehr, the German intelligence service 
that operated the spy and saboteur programs, fell into Allied hands at 
the end of the war, they were not tried as the masters of prison camp 
																																																								
224 Danner & Martinez, supra note 36, at 118. 
225 Adam Roberts, Land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg, in THE LAWS OF WAR: 
CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 116, 135 (Michael Howard et. al. 
ed., 1994) (This notes that although conviction of individuals based on wartime acts 
was controversial in many ways, it was not so in regard to grave breaches involving 
the treatment of prisoners and civilians because it “cannot have been wrong to 
punish these clear violations of the most elementary principles of decency.”).  
226 SOLIS, supra note 47, at 357. 
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guards and executioners had been.227  The international community 
has simply never found conspiracy or either of the arguably 
conspiracy-like forms of liability to be appropriate in trials for crimes 
for which guilt is dependent on the identity of the accused as an 
unprivileged combatant.228  Yet the U.S. military commissions in the 
war against Al Qaeda have focused on that exact circumstance.  And 
it is exactly that circumstance that has been rejected time and again 
by appellate courts, both military and civilian. 
IV. METAMORPHOSIS: WHEN LOSING IS WINNING 
To characterize these prosecutorial setbacks as Asculum 
defeats requires recognizing them as strategic victories.  That can 
only be true if they prepared the legal battlefield for future victories 
by the government, or at least helped it to avoid more serious defeats.  
It is possible that the consistent rejection of expanded liability for 
belligerency offenses has done both: in the case of the highest-profile 
detainee, Khalid Shaikh Muhammed (“KSM”), the self-professed 
mastermind of the September 11 attacks,229 a reluctance to conduct a 
trial by military commission might prove a strategic victory for the 
government.  Further, in the imaginable world of future conflicts, a 
recognition of conspiracy liability for belligerency offenses might 
well prove disastrous for U.S. interests. 
																																																								
227 Indeed, General Erwin von Lahousen, who headed the organization, testified as a 
witness against former colleagues at Nuremberg.  See PIERCE O’DONNELL, IN TIME OF 
WAR: HITLER’S TERRORIST ATTACK ON AMERICA 288 (2005). 
228 Of course, as every modern power has operated spy services and other clandestine 
agencies, there were any number of available targets for such prosecutions, had any 
nation so desired. 
229 Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal 
Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 175 (2005) (noting that he developed the idea of hijacking 
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A. Tomorrow: The Puzzle of Khalid Shaikh Muhammed 
1. A Military Commission Trial of KSM?  
KSM came into U.S. custody in 2003, when the Pakistani 
Inter-Services Intelligence, possibly assisted by the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, captured him.230  In 2006, he was transferred to 
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Facility, and President Bush announced 
that he would face trial by military commission.231  He was charged, 
and a motions battle began that would prevent any meaningful 
progress in this most important test of the military commissions 
system.232  Because of the stops and starts that occurred in the much 
less weighty cases of people like Hamdan and Khadr, KSM’s case had 
not even had a panel seated before the end of the Bush presidency.233  
A trial by military commission of KSM is well within the 
historical use of such a commission.  It would be a legitimate legal 
proceeding.  The previous reconsidering of the functions of military 
commissions, however, suggests that it would not be a wise legal 
proceeding.  
As noted earlier, there are three separate types of military 
commissions.234  These three types, however, can be reorganized into 
two groups, based on their strategic function.  Some of these 
commissions are necessary; others are merely useful.  Both martial 
law and military government courts are necessary.  Human society 
cannot long function at an advanced level without a means for 
determining liability when crimes occur.  Martial law is a long-
recognized temporary necessity in response to a breakdown in the 
																																																								
230 Gregory S. McNeal, A Cup of Coffee After the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary 
Post-Abuse Statements, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 947 (2010). 
231 Dana Carver Boehm, Guantanamo Bay and the Conflict of Ethical Lawyering, 117 
PA. ST. L. REV. 283, 292 (2012). 
232 Charges were not preferred, or formally initiated, until April 15, 2008, and 
referred to the military commission for trial by the convening authority on  
May 9, 2008.  United States v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Charge Sheet (May 2008).  
233 As of the date of publication, there has still been no panel seated, and no evidence 
offered.  See Gordon Mehler & Philip Hilder, It’s High Time the 9/11 Five Were 
Brought to Trial, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 8, 2015). 
234 See supra Section I.A. 
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civil government's ability to maintain ordered liberty.235  Likewise, an 
occupation cannot be legitimate or successful if the occupier has no 
way to protect society from the predations of crime.  In every area in 
which the military is the only authority, the military must take on 
this role, however ill-suited it may be to it.236 
On the other hand, law of war commissions are never 
necessary.237  Those accused of violating the law of armed conflict 
may be dealt with in many ways, from trial in ordinary domestic 
courts,238 to military detention with release at (or after) the end of the 
hostilities,239 to, in the view of some, summary execution.240  When 
nations individually 241  or collectively 242  opt to establish such 
commissions, they do so due to their usefulness and not necessity.  
																																																								
235 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 92 (“The framers of the Hague Regulations were afraid 
that the Occupying Power might tolerate pervasive turmoil and turbulence, not 
lifting a finger to prevent rampant anarchy from paralyzing the whole life of the 
civilian population.”). 
236 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866) (“On the theatre of active military 
operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for 
the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society, 
and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until 
the laws can have their free course.”). 
237 Perhaps because there is always another option for such fora, they are not without 
limits.  See Gerald Neuman, Extraterritoriality and the Interest of the United States in 
Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1441, 1459 (2014) (noting that the 
Boumediene case rejected the extreme view suggested by Verdugo-Urquidez that 
foreign nationals involuntarily in U.S. territory have no constitutional protections). 
238Alexander, supra note 11, at 1118 (“All of the acts that have been charged as 
military commission offenses are crimes under the U.S. Code and could be 
prosecuted as such.”). 
239 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“The capture and detention of 
lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 
‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war.”) (quoting Ex 
parte Quinn, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942)). 
240 TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 29 (1992) (describing the original British desire at the 
close of World War II that the senior leaders of the Nazi regime be “punished by a 
joint decision of the Governments of the Allies”). 
241 Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2560 n.91 (1991) (noting Israel’s 
reliance on universal jurisdiction when prosecuting Adolf Eichmann for Nazi war 
crimes in a domestic court). 
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The primary purpose of law of war military commissions is 
education.243   The existence of a trial, even in an unfamiliar military 
format, has showcased the offenses of the accused in an attempt to 
prevent others from imitating, or even admiring, the alleged 
wrongdoer.244  That was arguably the primary accomplishment of the 
most-lauded set of military commissions, those that heard the cases 
of prominent Nazis at Nuremberg after World War II.245  Some have 
argued that the same is true of the trial of the Nazi saboteurs during 
World War II, although there the purpose was at least in part the 
concealment of certain information.246  It was reasonable for the 
United States to fear that the Third Reich would repeat its attempts 
with a more loyal group of saboteurs247 had they known that the 
failure was largely due to a betrayal by one of the saboteurs upon his 
arrival by mini-submarine.248  By conducting the trial in the closed 
setting of a secretive military commission, the Roosevelt 
administration was able to convey the incredible effectiveness of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to internal and external observers.249  
																																																																																																																					
242 TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 25 (noting the initiation of the Inter-Allied Commission 
on the Punishment of War Crimes at the beginning of 1942). 
243 Regarding trying the Nazi leadership, Lt. Col. Bernays of the U.S. War 
Department wrote his wife that “[n]ot to try these beasts would be to miss the 
educational and therapeutic opportunity of our generation.”  Borgwardt, supra  
note 199, at 408-09. 
244 This is a role of tribunals in any situation in which a significant change of 
government leaves people seeking justice for past wrongs, an area referred to as 
transitional justice.  Danner & Martinez, supra note 36, at 90 (citing the 
retrospective use of the term “transitional justice” regarding the Nuremberg trials). 
245 Rpt. from Robert H. Jackson, Sup. Ct. Justice, to Harry S. Truman, President of 
the U.S., International Conference on Military Trials (Oct. 7, 1946) (noting that the 
military commissions "…documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions, 
persecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that there can 
be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future…"). 
246 O’DONNELL, supra note 86, at 121 (“What [Attorney General] Biddle did not tell 
the secretary of war, however, was that he did not want the press and public to know 
that both German teams had found it so easy to penetrate America’s defenses.”). 
247 Id. at 125. 
248 See LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS & PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 94 (2005).  
249 O’DONNELL, supra note 86, at 105.  The German High Command named the 
attempt by the saboteurs of the Quirin case for Franz Pastorius, the poet who led the 
first German immigrant community in America, in 1683.  Id. at 21.  See generally Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
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Although many have criticized the decision to try the saboteurs by 
military commission, Adolf Hitler made no significant further 
attempts to infiltrate the United States following the Quirin Group’s 
failure.250 
Bringing global attention to the cruelty of Al Qaeda, and the 
merciless way in which it chooses its victims, might go a long way 
toward reducing the ability of it and groups like it to recruit to their 
cause.251  The pain of victims, splashed across the internet for all to 
see, is a powerful counter-recruiting tool.  Indeed, one of the specific 
goals of the post-World War II trials was the ability to allow both 
sides to offer their best arguments for their behavior, counting on 
humanity to discern between them.252  As Justice Robert Jackson 
noted in his closing argument, “[t]he future will never have to ask, 
with misgiving, what could the Nazis have said in their favor.  
History will know that whatever could be said, they were allowed to 
say.” 253   Unfortunately, the convoluted legal proceedings of the 
current military commissions, and their use of trials for belligerency 
offenses, have undermined their ability to teach.  While the 
Nuremberg trials were and continue to be viewed as role models for 
the expression of international outrage,254 the U.S. War on Terror 
military commissions have caused massive criticism.255  What might 
once have been a powerful forum for the denunciation of an evil 
breach of the gravest responsibilities of an interdependent world has 
																																																								
250 O’DONNELL, supra note 86, at 284 (noting that the German Navy was reluctant to 
risk a U-Boat for another futile sabotage mission). 
251 Biddle, supra note 51, at 680 (quoting diplomat and author Harold Nicolson as 
noting that at the International Military Tribunal "the inhuman is being confronted 
with the humane, ruthlessness with equity, lawlessness with patient justice, and 
barbarism with civilization"). 
252 As it is of other "transitional" trials, marking the ends of oppressive or evil 
regimes.  See Allison Danner & Martinez, supra note 36, at 91. 
253 19 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 – 1 OCTOBER 1946, at 399 (1948). 
254 TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 634-35 (1992); Theodor Meron, Reflections on the 
Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 552 
(2006) (“The Nuremberg experiment in particular proved to be, as Justice Jackson 
had hoped, a triumph of reason.”). 
255 Even by those who should logically be, or once were, supporters of the military 
commissions.  Glazier, supra note 65, at 184 (2008) (describing the sudden departure 
from the commissions of Colonel Morris Davis). 
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now degenerated into an extraordinary court dismissed by many as a 
secretive cure for tortured confessions, and a means of imposing 
liability on hapless people who had the temerity to oppose the United 
States in its muscular overseas behavior.  Lessons taught by a military 
commission in the case of KSM will simply not be learned.256 
2. A Federal Trial of KSM? 
One of the early announcements of President Obama's first 
Attorney General, Eric Holder, was that KSM would be transferred to 
New York City, where he would stand trial for the attacks in a federal 
court, not a military commission.257 
This announcement led to outrage. 258   Within a year, a 
bipartisan group in Congress passed an appropriations bill that 
forbade the spending of federal dollars to transport any detained 
person from Guantanamo Bay to the United States, for trial or 
otherwise.259  Although part of the rationale for this statute was the 
preservation of Guantanamo Bay as a detention center, part of the 
discussion focused on KSM himself.260  Possibly with a sense of 
resignation, the Administration restarted military commission 
proceedings against KSM.261 
The rejection of a federal trial for KSM was a disturbing 
development for two reasons.  Due to the nature of the offenses KSM 
is accused of, his trial, similar to the trials of other high-profile 
																																																								
256 Morris D. Davis, Guantanamo's Charade of Justice, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 27, 2015,  
at A21 ("Guantanamo has come to symbolize torture and indefinite detention, and 
its court system has been discredited as an opaque and dysfunctional process.").  
Morris Davis is a retired Air Force Colonel who served as the third Chief Prosecutor 
of the Military Commissions.  
257 Alexander, supra note 11, at 572. 
258 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.  
REV. 5150, 5166 (2011) (calling the opposition to a trial in the U.S. “a storm of 
political opposition”). 
259 Alexander, supra note 11, at 588-89. 
260 155 CONG. REC. H12993-01 (2009) (statement of Rep. Gohmert) ("He says, 'We 
ask to be near to God'-this Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who our President is inviting 
to come to New York City.  We fight you and destroy you and terrorize you.'  Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed said this in his pleading."). 
261 United States v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Charge Sheet (May 2011). 
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detainees, would be qualitatively different from previous military 
commissions.  KSM was accused of—and has announced 
responsibility for, on several occasions—the intentional targeting of 
non-combatants on a vast scale.262  No one has the legal authority to 
do that.  No combatant immunity exists that protects anyone from 
culpability if they commit a grave breach of the law of armed conflict.  
And there is no doubt that the hijacking of civilian aircraft to fly into 
civilian skyscrapers is a grave breach of international law.263 
KSM’s trial, therefore, would focus on what he did, not who 
he was.  Unlike Hicks, Hamdan, Khadr, and the rest, KSM’s charges 
relate to behavior that would be punishable by military commissions 
whether committed by civilians or military personnel.264  It would, in 
that regard, resemble the trials of major war criminals in both 
Europe and the Pacific following World War II.  There was no 
question that military officers like General Yamashita were proper 
combatants.265 They could not have been punished for their efforts 
leading military operations against the Allies:266 indeed, punishing 
proper combatants for their legitimate wartime activities is itself a 
																																																								
262 See, e.g., Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal for  
ISN 10024, at 18.  But cf., McNeal, supra note 230, at 951 (“The legitimacy of KSM's 
confessions is in question because many of his statements are the product of torture 
or abusive treatment.”). 
263 But cf. Glazier, supra note 13, at 961 (noting that the World Trade Center was 
arguably a lawful target as an object “with a significant economic value”). 
264 TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 628 (1992) (“It is true that, until Nuremberg, most of 
the trials based on the laws of war . . . were trials of military defendants.  But I know 
of nothing in the laws of war that excludes unarmed civilians who violate the laws of 
war from criminal liability.”). 
265 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
266 So, for example, Göring, the Reichsminister of Aviation, was indicted for war 
crimes, including murder and ill treatment of civilians, killing of hostages, and 
collective punishment of civilians, but nothing that resembled liability for any of the 
belligerency offenses committed against the Allies.  The same was true of the other 
officers on trial, including Keitel and Jodl.  I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 – 1  
OCTOBER 1946, at 27-68. (1947).  
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violation of the law of armed conflict, one that the United States and 
its allies have punished in the past.267 
A federal trial could allow for the denunciation of an evil 
breach of the gravest responsibility that a commission will not.268  
The federal court system, though not perfect, is unquestionably 
viewed domestically and abroad as both more fair and more open 
than a military commission.  A trial in such a court, using existing 
rules of evidence and procedure, could not fail to both be and seem 
more just than a special court hobbled together for the purpose, 
particularly one that has already experienced so much chaos. 
Ironically, the particular judicial defeats the United States 
has most recently suffered would not, by themselves, bar a trial of 
KSM.  The attacks of September 11 constitute a grave breach, and 
KSM could be charged with liability for those offenses under the 
internationally accepted doctrine of command responsibility, even if 
the Bahlul opinion continues to prevent conspiracy trials as a 
violation of the constitutional separation of powers.  It remains to be 
seen, of course, whether the U.S. Supreme Court will reverse the 
judgment of the D.C. Circuit that the Constitution limits military 
commission trials to offenses recognized by the international law of 
armed conflict.  Even if the Court let that decision stand, however, 
there is little ground for the argument that the leader of the 
September 11 attacks, in deliberately targeting defenseless civilians, 
did not commit a violation of the law of war.  Putting him on trial 
would not be a novel development. 
The trial of General Yamashita at the close of World War II 
brings the point into stark relief.269  His military commission trial was 
a litany of horror, as witness after witness recounted monstrous acts 
committed against a civilian population by Imperial Japanese 
																																																								
267 The War Crimes Charge at Nuremberg included the allegation that "Frenchmen 
fighting with the Soviet Army who were captured were handed over to the Vichy 
Government for 'proceedings.'"  Id. at 54 (Charge 3(c)).  
268 But, cf. Huq, supra note 13, at 1497 (arguing that the redundancy of having both 
military commissions and federal courts available is important to reduce the risk of 
inaccurate acquittals, or “false negatives”).  
269 See generally In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).  
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soldiers under his command.270  No evidence showed that he directly 
participated.271  The government did not even have evidence of a 
direct order for the atrocities.272  Nonetheless, a panel convicted 
General Yamashita of liability as a commander for these grave 
breaches, as they presumably found it impossible to believe that he 
had not known or could not stop the behavior of his troops.273 
In much the same way, a trial of KSM could focus on his 
responsibility for the September 11 attacks despite the fact that he 
was far away from these breaches.  Evidence that he bore 
responsibility would fit logically under the command responsibility 
prong of liability.  Even an international lawyer who rejected the 
																																																								
270 Id. at 5 (noting that the commission heard two hundred and eighty-six witnesses).  
See also Danner & Martinez, supra note 36, at 123-24. 
271 A FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA 174 (1971) ("there was no 
finding of any order, any knowledge, any condonation on General Yamashita's 
part"). 
272 During closing arguments, the prosecution appealed instead to a fire at a circus in 
Connecticut, after which employees were found guilty of manslaughter because they 
failed to prevent the loss of life.  Id. at 165-66.  
273 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 16 ("There is no contention that the present charge, thus 
read, is without the support of evidence, or that the commission held petitioner 
responsible for failing to take measures which were beyond his control or 
inappropriate for a commanding officer to take in the circumstances.")  This 
treatment of command responsibility was the focus of the criticism of Justice 
Murphy, who argued that, in light of the lack of evidence of direct involvement by 
General Yamashita and the difficulties of maintaining control in the face of an Allied 
attack, the charges could be translated to:  
We, the victorious American forces, have done everything possible to destroy 
and disorganize your lines of communication, your effective control of your 
personnel, your ability to wage war. In those respects, we have succeeded. We 
have defeated and crushed your forces. And now, we charge and condemn you 
for having been inefficient in maintaining control of your troops during the 
period when we were so effectively besieging and eliminating your forces and 
blocking your ability to maintain effective control. Many terrible atrocities 
were committed by your disorganized troops. Because these atrocities were so 
widespread, we will not bother to charge or prove that you committed, 
ordered, or condoned any of them. We will assume that they must have 
resulted from your inefficiency and negligence as a commander. In short, we 
charge you with the crime of inefficiency in controlling your troops. We will 
judge the discharge of your duties by the disorganization which we ourselves 
created in large part. Our standards of judgment are whatever we wish to 
make them. 
Id. at 34-35. 
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term “conspiracy” would nonetheless recognize this as command 
responsibility for the underlying offense. 274   She might well 
characterize it, in the language of the International Criminal Court, 
as ordering the commission of a crime which in fact occurred.  But 
she would not reject a finding of liability for orchestrating the 
September 11 attacks as a peculiarity of the Anglo-American system. 
Thus, defeats on the material support and conspiracy 
battlefields have, in truth, done nothing to harm the chance of an 
effective prosecution of KSM as an individual for his individual 
offenses.  Those defeats, however, exist in the understanding of the 
public.  Critics may use them as evidence of the flaws in the system.  
They have done significant damage to a military commission system 
already laboring under the burden of being perceived an 
extraordinary and unfair tribunal.  A trial of KSM in a military 
commission could “succeed,” if that term is taken to mean only that 
there would be a finding of guilt with an accompanying lengthy or 
even capital sentence.  
If, however, success includes the educational function of a 
useful law of war military commission, failure in a KSM trial is 
foreordained.  In 2003, such a military commission was possible.275  
More than a dozen years later, an ideological victory in such a forum 
is an impossibility.  The only chance for global public education as a 
result of a trial of KSM exists in a federal court.  If the defeats 
suffered by the government at the hands of federal courts in the cases 
of Hamdan and Bahlul lead the United States to trying KSM in a 
federal court, they will have been Asculum defeats indeed. 
B. The Day After Tomorrow: Military Operations in an 
 Alternate Universe 
Whatever may happen with KSM, the United States has 
already won one victory by losing a series of cases.  In military 
																																																								
274 See supra Section II.B4(a). 
275 There would still have been opposition and objection, of course.  See e.g., Katyal & 
Tribe, supra note 62. That was nonetheless a very different world from the current 
one, in which a former Chief Prosecutor can write an editorial decrying the entire 
process.  See Davis, supra note 256. 
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commissions as well as in the federal courts, the government has 
consistently failed to convince judicial authorities that belligerency 
offenses were properly subject to either a material support or 
conspiracy charge when tried by military commission.  This position 
has frustrated some members of the government, several 
commentators, and a few dissenting judges.  Their frustration over 
the short-term loss unfortunately causes them to miss the true 
significance of the catastrophic harm to U.S. interests that would 
have come with a victory.  
Their displeasure is understandable.  For centuries, military 
commissions have tried cases involving belligerency offenses that 
were nonetheless labeled violations of the law of war.  In those cases, 
however, there was never a sense that liability extended beyond the 
individual.  When General Washington convened a board of officers 
to try British Major John Andre, captured in civilian clothes after 
receiving the plans for West Point from Benedict Arnold, he was 
confident that it was legitimate to punish Andre for this behavior.276  
Like the Nazi saboteurs, it was the choice to remove his uniform that 
doomed John Andre.  His protestations that he was a lawful member 
of His Majesty’s Army were unavailing, because he was disguised as a 
noncombatant when he committed the acts in question. 
Significantly, there was no sense—in 1780, or in 1942—that 
the liability for the offenses extended beyond the individual 
participants.  Neither General Washington nor any member of his 
staff suggested that the British government had in some way violated 
international law.277  The same was true of the German special 
operations branch that sent the saboteurs to the United States.  They 
trained, armed, equipped, and transported the eight men to New 
York and Florida.278  Yet, although six of the eight were themselves 
executed for their acts, no member of the German military hierarchy 
																																																								
276 WILLIAM STERNE RANDALL, BENEDICT ARNOLD: PATRIOT AND TRAITOR 565-66 
(1990). 
277 Indeed, General Washington himself employed spies.  NATHAN MILLER, SPYING 
FOR AMERICA: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE 6 (1989) (noting that 
Washington “personally recruited agents, issued them instructions, and analyzed 
and acted upon their reports”).  
278 O’DONNELL, supra note 86, at 21. 
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ever faced trial for the Quirin Group’s sabotage attempt.279  There 
was significantly more evidence against the leadership of the German 
high command, in this regard, than there was against General 
Yamashita.280  The lack of a single trial evidences the broad consensus 
that committing a belligerency offense was an individual 
responsibility only. 
This comparison of General Yamashita and the architects of 
the Quirin Group sabotage plans brings into stark relief the 
underlying distinction between grave breaches and belligerency 
offenses.  In the category of grave breaches are those acts that 
individual states in the international community wish to see 
outlawed.  Each nation is content that no nation should commit 
them, and each is thus willing to forgo any short-term advantage that 
might be gained through their commission.  Such acts are so roundly 
condemned that jurisdiction exists everywhere and forever.281 
If there is an international agreement on belligerency 
offenses, it is the opposite one.  Each nation wishes to maintain the 
ability to punish individuals who seek to harm it, and reserves the 
right to try those who do not possess proper combatant immunity.  
On the other hand, virtually all nations wish to preserve the freedom 
to operate in such ways by themselves.  Most nations around the 
globe maintain official spy agencies, despite exemplars like John 
Andre.  The fact that individual members of such agencies are subject 
to punishment, even capital punishment, does not deter nations from 
training and deploying such people. 
Likewise, many governments wish to continue supporting 
unlawful combatants in missions of belligerency beyond mere 
spying.  From Iran’s support of Hezbollah282 to the United States’ 
																																																								
279 Id.  
280 Reel, supra note 271, at 160-61 (recounting the defense argument that the 
destruction of communications in the Philippines made it impossible for General 
Yamashita even to know that atrocities had occurred). 
281 Kenneth C. Randal, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 785, 810-15 (1988) (discussing the trial by Israel of Adolf Eichmann). 
282 Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2001) ("the 
Court also finds that The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian MOIS [Ministry 
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support for the Contras in the Central American wars of the 1980s,283 
nations frequently find it in their interests to arm, train, and assist 
civilians who undertake violent activities without the legal shield of 
combatant immunity.  
Indeed, the United States, despite pressing vigorously at 
military commission trials for responsibility for belligerency offenses, 
maintains an interest in promoting a robust series of such behaviors.  
An entire unified command, the United States Special Operations 
Command, exists to train and operate non-conventional forces.284  
Although many of the units of this command comply with all of the 
ordinary rules of uniform wear during armed conflict, many others 
do not.285  Soldiers and sailors in civilian clothes operate as if they 
were part of a civilian noncombatant population.  Those men and 
women are well aware that they are individually subject to 
prosecution for belligerency offenses, as Hicks and Hamdan were.286  
There is no expectation, though, that their trainers and supervisors at 
the Pentagon, or the White House, are subject to liability for 
employing them in pursuit of national objectives.287 
																																																																																																																					
of Information and Security] provided support, guidance, and resources to 
Hizbollah"). 
283 John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World 
Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 72 (1986). 
284 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2014). 
285 W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L  
L. 493, 498-99 (2003) (noting that in the Afghanistan conflict the "Commanding 
General made the uniform decision, favoring civilian clothing over DCU [Desert 
Camouflage Uniforms].  His rationale was based on two factors: (a) the ability of 
soldiers to perform humanitarian assistance operations; and (b) the safety of Civil 
Affairs personnel--that is, force protection."). 
286 SOLIS, supra note 47, at 224 (describing examples of the practice of fighting in 
civilian clothes from the First World War to the U.S. war in Afghanistan and 
concluding that "Commanders will continue to order subordinate combatants 
behind enemy lines to fight without uniform or distinctive sign and, knowing the 
risk, subordinate combatants will willingly comply).  
287 Indeed, some commentators have argued that not all wear of civilian clothes by 
combatants even violates the law of armed conflict.  See, e.g., Parks, supra note 285, 
at 523 ("State tolerance of Special Forces' fighting in civilian clothing is limited to 
special circumstances, such as support for partisans, which is consistent with 
humanitarian tolerance for captured guerrillas.").  Even if Col. Parks is correct, 
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Yet there would be such liability had the United States 
succeeded in the rewriting of the law of armed conflict so vigorously 
pursued by the prosecutors of the military commission.  If such a 
tribunal, adjudicating violations of international law, has jurisdiction 
to pronounce sentence on those who conspired with unlawful 
belligerents—or worse, those who “materially supported” 
organizations opposed to the adjudicating nation—then a whole new 
form of liability would develop.  A type of behavior participated in by 
many nations, including virtually all of the great powers, would 
suddenly be the subject of criminal prosecutions. 
The idea of high ranking American military officers, or even 
senior political officials, on trial for deploying special operations 
forces is one grotesquely at odds with a broadly held consensus, at 
least among government officials, on what behavior the United States 
should participate in. 288   Yet the only argument that could be 
deployed against such trials is the notion that something special 
about the United States elevates it above the rules that bind the rest 
of the international community.  If that is the meaning ascribed to 
the term “American exceptionalism,” it will only result in increasing 
global hostility and a desire by other nations to frustrate American 
objectives.  If a criminal system outlaws behavior not on the basis of 
what is done, but on who does it, the system will be untenable unless 
supported by a ruthless hegemony.289  The United States does not 
exercise that kind of hegemony in the world, nor should she, nor 
should any nation. 
V. RETURN TO TOMORROW: HOW THESE LOSSES HELP THE 
 GOVERNMENT 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States found 
itself in a troublingly novel position.  Global events and quickly-
																																																																																																																					
though, it is notable that even the cases of wear of civilian clothes that he would 
consider perfidious have not created liability for inchoate crimes. 
288 See Frakt, supra note 35, at 751 (noting the explanation by Harold Koh, Legal 
Advisor to the State Department, that criminalizing all civilian participation in 
hostilities could not be reconciled to the CIA’s drone program). 
289 TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 641 (“There is no moral or legal basis for immunizing 
victorious nations from scrutiny”). 
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made decisions left the United States holding a large number of 
foreign citizens with little precedent to guide in the ways in which 
they should be handled.  The rhetoric of endless war and their own 
great evil—they were, in the words of the Secretary of Defense, “the 
worst of the worst”290—blocked the logical step of treating them as if 
they were among the many ordinary prisoners of war and 
temporarily detained civilians that the military had experience in 
dealing with. 291   An answer of sorts was found in the quirky, 
malleable history of the military commissions. 
Unfortunately, most of those held by the United States were 
utterly unsuited for a role in a useful, educational military 
commission.  With only a handful of exceptions, the detainees were 
much more analogous to ordinary foot soldiers performing ordinary 
acts of combat.  It may be that combatant immunity did not protect 
them from the legal consequences of firing weapons at invading 
soldiers, but it was unlikely that the world community would develop 
any sense of outrage about their behavior.292 
Eventually, most of the detainees were simply released.  Most 
of those releases were accomplished with no fanfare, and little public 
attention.  This may be part of the reason that a significant 
percentage of the American people continue to wish the detention 
																																																								
290 Randall T. Coyne, A Law Professor's Reflections on Representing Guantánamo 
Detainees, 1 NE. U. L.J. 97, 98 (2009). 
291 In addition to the millions of prisoners of war whom the U.S. has detained 
throughout its history, the military had recent experience in conducting the 
tribunals mandated by Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention to determine 
whether a particular person was entitled to prisoner of war status, and hence 
protection from prosecution for belligerency offenses.  See Robert M. Chesney, Iraq 
and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the Other  
War, 2003-2010, 51 VA. J. INT'L. L. 549, 562 (2011) (noting that United States 
conducted almost twelve hundred such tribunals during the Gulf War in 1991). 
292 Consider, for example, the Canadian response to Omar Khadr: he has now not 
only been released on parole, but a judge ordered the removal of his electronic 
monitoring ankle device, apparently accepting his argument that it "was 
embarrassing and interfered with activities such as biking, swimming and playing 
soccer."  Judge Eases Omar Khadr’s Bail Conditions, No Monitoring Bracelet, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 18, 2015). 
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facility at Guantanamo Bay to remain open.293  A few detainees, like 
the Louisiana-born Yasir Esam Hamdi, became the subject of media 
focus, which created a certain dissonance between the language of 
the government and the ultimate conclusion of the detention story.294 
A few detainees, however, were men of substance, men who 
had played significant roles in the grave breaches committed in the 
name of Al Qaeda.  For these men, a prompt and open military 
commission might have taken on the role of Nuremberg, educating 
the world about the logical and horrible end result of that ideology.  
Such military commissions never happened; the government chose 
instead to start with small players, to test the system in a series of 
trials of belligerency offences.  In almost all of those cases, even the 
ones that seemed to be government victories at the time, the United 
States effort to conduct trials by military commissions have 
ultimately ended in defeat.  
In order to get convictions in those cases, the government 
attempted a dramatic revision of the law of armed conflict.  In the 
only real paradigm case, that of the Nazi saboteurs, the prosecution 
was aided by an informant within and a large amount of easily 
handled physical evidence.  In cases like those of Hicks and Hamdan, 
the government felt sufficiently ill-at-ease about the result that they 
resorted to novel twists.  The introduction of material support as a 
charge was one such twist, and it resulted in a quick and severe 
Asculum defeat. 
The use of conspiracy for belligerency offenses was defeated 
in a similar fashion, and the ramifications of that loss will redound to 
																																																								
293 PEW RESEARCH CTR., Obama Job Rating Ticks Higher, Views of Nation’s Economy 
Turn More Positive (Jan. 14, 2015) ("More Americans think closing the prison in the 
next few years is a bad idea (49%) than say it is a good idea (42%).”). 
294 Compare, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 4-5, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004) (No. 03-6696) (noting that only detainees with "a high potential intelligence 
value or pose a particular threat" would be transferred to Guantanamo Bay, and that 
Hamdi was one of those transferred) with Press Release, Mark Corallo, Dir. of Pub. 
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Regarding Yaser Hamdi (Sept. 22, 2004) (announcing 
the release of Hamdi to Saudi Arabia after the Supreme Court ruling in his favor 
with the observation that "the United States has no interest in detaining enemy 
combatants beyond the point that they pose a threat to the U.S. and our allies").	
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the benefit of the United States for years.  Initially, if the collapse of 
military commissions as a reliable way of adjudicating guilt reduces 
congressional opposition, it might allow a federal trial of KSM.  A 
trial of KSM in a forum recognized internationally for both 
legitimacy and dignity presents the best remaining option for a 
useful, educational airing of the extent of Al Qaeda's horror.  A trial 
of KSM in a military commission in 2003 might well have had a 
similar result, but that forum is now so damaged that any sentence 
from one would be tainted with illegitimacy and might well merely 
foster recruitment for Al Qaeda and other extremist groups. 
The spectacle of American leaders being called to answer for 
the new “crime” of training and deployment of spies and irregular 
forces would be a strategic defeat.  It, too, is made less likely by the 
smaller setbacks of the early military commission trials.  A world in 
which the community of nations has agreed to outlaw participation 
in irregular warfare, as it has agreed to outlaw the torture of 
prisoners of war, is not necessarily a bad one.  The nations of the 
world have not consciously considered and discussed the creation of 
such a world.  The short-term thinking of one great power should 
not seek to bring it into existence. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The desire to convict every battlefield opponent of the 
United States of a belligerency offense was misguided.  The plan to 
use the military commissions for that purpose was ill-conceived.  The 
series of small defeats that arose from a misunderstanding of the 
history and nature of military commissions, however, prevented a far 
greater strategic defeat for the long-term interests of the United 
States.  There remains the possibility that a public trial of those 
involved in the commission of grave breaches will improve the 
standing of the United States in the world community, and prove to 
be a rallying point for the use of law to combat terror.  If that 
happens, little credit will probably be given to the course of failures 
that made eventual success possible.  When we look back at the story 
of King Pyrrhus, the drama of his situation causes us to focus on the 
victory that offered him little solace.  For Hicks, and Hamdan, and 
Khadr, victory does not erase the years spent in difficult situations as 
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a detainee.  Those who think of Pyrrhus’ eponymous victory, 
however, should give a thought to Rome’s rise to power.  Without 
their defeats, the Romans could not have conquered.  Without the 
military commission losses, the United States would be in a far worse 
position, both today and tomorrow.  Indeed, one “victory” at such a 
proceeding might have utterly undone the nation. 
 
